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Articles
Neil Brooks* Flattening the Claims of the
Flat Taxers
The idea that income tax rate brackets should be flattened has gained some
support among neoclassical economists, right-wing think-tanks and Canadian
politicians. Those propounding the idea argue that flattening the rate structure will
simplify the tax system and reduce tax avoidance and evasion. They also argue
that it would usher in an era of increased economic prosperity by encouraging
talented Canadians to work harder, save and invest more, and remain in Canada.
In defending progressive taxation, this article takes issue with each of these
claims. It concludes that the fundamental differences between those who support
flat taxes and those who support progressive tax rates are their respective views
about the ethical justification for the market distribution of income and the need
for a relatively equal distribution of economic resources to sustain a vibrant
democratic and civic society.
L'id6e que les tranches de taux d'imposition sur le revenu doivent 6tre aplanies
a gagne un certain appui parmi les 6conomistes n6oclassiques, les cellules de
r6flexion de droite, et les politiciens canadiens. Ceux qui proposent cette id6e
argumentent qu'en aplanissant la structure des taux d'imposition le systeme de
taxation serait simplifie et I'6vasion et la fraude fiscale seraient reduites. Is
ajoutent que cela entrafnerait une nouvelle epoque de prosp6rit6 6conomique en
encourageant les Canadiens doues a travailler plus fort, d'6pargner et investir
d'avantage ainsi qu'a demeurerau Canada. En defendant la taxation progressive,
cet article traite de chacune de ces pr6tentions. L 'auteur conclut que la difference
fondamentale entre ceux qui appuient I'aplanissement des taux d'imposition et
ceux qui appuient des taux de taxation progressifs est bas6e sur leurs opinions
respectives concernant la justification ethique quanta la distribution des revenus
du marche et la n6c6ssit6 d'une distribution relativement 6gale des ressources
dconomiques pour permettre le maintien d'une soci6t6 civique, d6mocratique et
vibrante.
* Neil Brooks teaches tax law and policy at Osgoode Hall Law School. This is an expanded
version of the 1997 annual Horace Read Lecture. I would like to thank my colleague Reuben
Hasson for his always helpful comments and Patrick Smith for his indefatigable research
assistance.
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Introduction
The idea that income tax rate brackets should be flattened has gained
some support among Canadian politicians. Those propounding the idea
argue that flattening the rate structure would simplify the tax system and
reduce tax avoidance and evasion. Most importantly, they argue that it
would usher in an era of increased economic prosperity by encouraging
talented Canadians to work harder, save and invest more, and remain in
Canada. In defending progressive taxation, this article takes issue with
each of these claims. It concludes that very likely the fundamental
differences between those who support flat taxes and those who support
progressive tax rates are their respective views about the ethical justifi-
cation for the market distribution of income and the need for a relatively
equal distribution of economic resources to sustain a vibrant democratic
and civic society.
I. Explaining The Enigmatic Attraction of Flat Taxes
It is a great pleasure to be invited to give the Read lecture. Like so many
others, I have long been an admirer of legal education at Dalhousie.
Horace Read was, of course, Dalhousie's first Dean who was also a
professional law teacher and he is widely recognized as being one of the
founders of modern legal education in Canada. Further to his credit, it was
under his Deanship that taxation was introduced as a serious subject of
study at Dalhousie. In 1959 he hired Ed Harris to be the first full-time
faculty member to teach tax law. Before that time, tax law was regarded
as 'too practical' to be considered an academic subject. The other slightly
less tenuous connection the subject matter of my remarks have to Dean
Read's legal contributions is that he had a passionate scholarly interest in
legislation and the legislative process. Tax law is entirely statutory - in
origin, in design and in substance. No principle of common law holds that
everyone must turn a portion of their earnings over to the state. However,
having made those connections between Dean Read and the subject
matter of my talk, I rather suspect that he would not agree with very much
of what I am going to say, but in that regard he would no doubt be in good
company.
The title to this lecture discloses its general tenor. Other possible titles
might include: "The Flaky Tax," "The Flat Tax Scam," "Flat Taxer's Flat
Deceptions," "With Income Tax, 'Flattery' Will Get You Nowhere,"
"The Flat Tax Society," "Flat Taxes for Fat Cats," or "Deflating the Flat
Tax." Unfortunately, some of these titles have been claimed by fellow-
travellers more imaginative than I. Although this point might seem
obvious by now, to fully reveal my theoretical and ideological hand, I am
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not in favour of flat taxes. Further, I think the progressivity of our present
tax system should be greatly increased. Indeed, I have tried to make a
career out of one fairly straightforward idea - namely that the rich and
large corporations ought to pay their fair share of tax.' My career has not
been all that successful, in fact, it has been a total failure. The rich and
large corporations continue to make out like bandits through the tax
system.
I would like so much to make the rich pay that it sometimes embar-
rasses me to have to tell people I am a tax lawyer. Almost by definition,
the sole role of tax lawyers is to serve the rich and large corporations. By
way of apology, I am always quick to point out that I do not actually
practice tax law, I only teach it. But frankly, it has never been clear to me
which profession has less social value. Teaching students tax law,
knowing that at least some of them are going to go down to Bay Street and
use the skills and knowledge they learn in my courses to help the rich pay
even less tax, used to cause me a good deal of anxiety. Once when I was
lamenting to one of my classes the consternation this disjuncture in my
life caused me, some student at the back of the room rose and said that if
it was any consolation to me, I was not doing a very good job of it. That
made me feel a whole lot better about myself and my job in the university.
1. 1 do have a philosophy as to why the rich should be made to pay their fair share of tax,
however, to be frank, my firm belief is likely accounted for, in part, because I remain an
unrepentant product of the 1960s. If a person who went to university during that decade is to
remain faithful to their generational roots, wanting to make the rich pay their fair share would
appear obligatory. Since the 1960s the idea has not had much currency; however, there is now
a Web site in the United States at which one can join the TAX THE RICH cause and even
become part of a nationwide saturation postering campaign by ordering posters proclaiming
"Is any man worth 3,000 nurses?" or "Lower the maximum wage." See the United for a Fair
Economy site at [http://www.stw.org/taxtherich/contents.html].
Parenthetically, in urging that the rich should pay their fair share of tax, I cannot recall how
many times I have been accused of attempting to start a class war, among other less kindly
accusations. This is a common strategy of those who would defend the privilege of great wealth
and power. It was with some comfort that I recently noticed that even the Treasury Secretary
of the United States has been so accused. Last year Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers
suggested in testimony before a congressional committee that those who were pushing for a cut
in the estate tax were motivated by "selfishness." He was bitterly attacked in Congress and the
popular press for promoting "class warfare." Even though his assertions seems uncontentious,
he was forced to apologize. See M. Cottle, "The Real Class War: When it Comes to Taxes, It's
the Rich Against the Rest of Us" The Washington Monthly (July/August 1997) 12. This is so
silly. Why is it class warfare to argue that the rich should pay more tax, but it is not to argue
that they should pay less? Further, anyone who doubts that there is a class war going on has not
been following government policy over the past couple of decades and, in spite of rising
economic growth, the rising increase in poverty rates and income and wealth inequality. See
for example R. Ellsworth, "Squandering Our Inheritance: Re-Forming the Canadian Welfare
State in the 1990s" (1997) 12 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 259. All those who want to make the rich pay
their fair share of tax want to do is turn the battle around a little bit.
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The idea of a flat tax has attracted a good deal of political attention. It
has been a major item on the political agenda both in Canada and the
United States on a number of occasions over the past two decades. As
Canadians discuss what to do with the so-called fiscal dividend, now that
the Federal government appears to have vastly overshot its deficit targets,
the flat taxers will undoubtedly once again be out in force arguing, in
effect, that it would be in the best interests of everyone if individual greed
was completely liberated and democratic decision-making was further
constrained by reducing the progressivity of the tax system. Many
interest groups and most of the leading newspapers appear to be in favour
of a major tax cut. If past experience is any indication, the Reform and
Progressive Conservative parties, business interests, major right-wing
think-tanks, and others who generally represent the interests of the rich
and powerful in public debate, will attempt to hijack this tax cut move-
ment to push for flatter tax rates.
On its face, the political attraction of the idea of flat taxes is somewhat
of a mystery. After all, as Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija have noted,' in
most contexts the word flat does not connote a good thing: think of beer,
or music, or a tire, or a joke that falls flat, or a market that remains flat.
Sometimes flat is used to suggest something that has lost the value it once
had: a movie that was widely admired in the 1960s might seem flat today.
An author's portrayal of flat characters is often taken to betray evidence
of a shallow mind. Moreover, there is no question that flattening the
income tax rates would increase the taxes paid by the middle class. If a
flat tax reduces the rates paid by the rich, and exempts the very poor (as
most flat tax proposals do), the relative percentage of taxes paid by the
middle class must go up, even if taxes are reduced. This is elementary
mathematics.
Flat taxes appear to have political appeal only because flat taxers
misleadingly conflate the case for flat taxes with the case for broadening
the tax base, reducing taxes, simplifying the tax system, and closing
loopholes ostensibly so that the rich pay at least some tax. In all these
respects, the rhetorical appeal of flat taxes is misleading. In selling flat
taxes as if it were a populist idea that deserves the support of the middle-
class, and in attempting to capitalize on populist discontent with the tax
system, flat taxers are being deceitful. I will return to this point. Of course
it remains to be seen whether the idea of a flat tax can gain so much
popular support that it will be enacted. In the past, when the idea of
2. J. Slemrod & J. Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen's Guide to the Great Debate Over Tax
Reform (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996) at 161.
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enacting a flat tax has taken centre stage as a political issue it has initially
excited great attention but then has relatively quickly faded from political
view. Perhaps this is an indication that people are not as easily fooled as
the tax flatteners would believe. Once the public realizes the perverse
distributional consequences of abandoning progressive tax rates, even
the promises that they will be able to file their income tax return on a post
card or that reduced taxes on the rich will lead to a burst of economic
activity do not look so attractive.
II. Examining the Origins of the Idea of Flat Taxes
and Recent Incarnations
I. The Mean-Spirited Assault on Progressivity
Over the past two decades, governments of a number of industrialized
countries have attempted a political initiative unique in this century - a
sustained and deliberate redistribution of income from the poor and the
middle-class to the rich. The frontal assault on the welfare state began in
the United Kingdom and the United States, where it was referred to as
Thatcherism and Reaganism; however, the program to make the rich
richer has been apparent in many other industrialized countries, including
Canada. The ideological basis for this fundamental redirection in policy
is neoconservatism or the new right.
3
The basic thrust of this agenda has been to marginalize the political
system and to concentrate power in the private sector where it can be
exercised free from any serious constraint by those with significant
economic resources. To achieve this end, every policy instrument that
citizens use to achieve their collective goals through democratic institu-
tions has been maligned and stunted: state enterprises and even social
services have been privatized, industrial and financial sectors have been
deregulated; environmental and consumer regulations abandoned, social
security programs have been reduced, and union power has been curbed.
However, one of the most mean-spirited forms this attack on democratic
institutions has taken has been the attempt to reduce the progressivity of
the tax system. It is no surprise that taxes, and in particular the progressive
income tax, would bear the brunt of the assault by the new right. Taxes
3. Books on neoconservatism and the implementation of the corporate agenda in Canada are
legion. Recent popular studies include M. Dobbin, The Myth of the Good Corporate Citizen:
Democracy Under the Rule of Big Business (Toronto: Stoddart, 1998); L. McQuaig, The Cult
of Impotence: Selling the Myth of Powerlessness in the Global Economy (Toronto: Penguin,
1998); and J. McMurtry, Unequal Freedoms: The Global Market as an Ethical System
(Toronto: Garamond Press, 1998).
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make possible many of the programs that provide economic security to
workers and citizens with low incomes. Moreover, tax policy is
quintessentially a matter of class politics, and progressive tax rates are,
at least symbolically, a minor victory for the masses.4 The flat tax
movement is simply the culmination of this attack on taxes and progres-
sive rates.
2. Flat Taxes in the United States: One More Time, With Feeling
Like many public policies designed to increase inequalities, the flat tax
originated in the United States. Although the debate over proportionality
versus progressive taxes raged in the United States for over 50 years prior
to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, which authorized the
passage of a federal income tax with progressive rates,5 during most of
this century, at least until the last couple of decades, the idea of progres-
sive tax rates was widely accepted and remained relatively unquestioned.
But while there was a general consensus on the desirability ofprogressivity
during this period, there was also an undercurrent of opposition from the
libertarians. Frederick Hayek and Milton Friedman at the University of
Chicago and Ludwig von Mises all wrote strong critiques of progressive
taxation, and called for a flat-rate tax.6 The most influential attack on
progressive rates during this period, and the one that Hayek attributes to
re-opening the debate,7 was Walter Blum and Harry Kalven's masterful
and lucid book, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation.8 Although
they called their book the "uneasy case" for progressive taxation, which
might be taken to imply there is a case but it is difficult, they in fact did
4. For an extended discussion of the ideas suggested in this paragraph see N. Brooks, "The
Changing Structure of the Canadian Tax System: Accommodating the Rich" (1993) 31
Osgoode Hall L.J. 137.
5. S.A. Bank, "Origins ofa Flat Tax" (1996) 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 329.
6. See M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)
at 174 ("All things considered, the personal income tax structure that seems to me best is a flat-
rate tax on income above an exemption, with income defined very broadly and deductions
allowed only for strictly defined expenses of earning income."); F.A. Hayek, The Constitution
of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960) at 322 ("If a reasonable system of
taxation is to be achieved, people must recognize as a principle that the majority which
determines what the total amount of taxation should be must also bear it at the maximum rate.");
L. von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1949) at 803 ("It is very different for 90 percent of the population to vote taxes on themselves
and an exemption of 10 percent than for 90 percent to vote punitive taxes on the other
10 percent.... If a reasonable system of taxation is to be achieved, people must recognize as
a principle that the majority which determines what the total amount of taxation should be must
also bear it at the maximum rate.").
7. Hayek, ibid. at 516.
8. W.J. Blum & H. Kalven Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1953).
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not support progressivity. In addition to the slightly misleading title, their
book is written with such apparent courtesy, caution and objectivity that
their conclusion is sometimes overlooked by liberals who frequently
refer to the book approvingly.9
Blum and Kalven's preferred tax structure was a flat rate with a basic
exemption - they called it a degressive tax." Over the years, Blum has
reconsidered the conclusion of his and Kalven' s monograph, and on each
occasion has restated it with greater conviction. In 1976 he re-considered
the "uneasy case" for progressivity in light of the apparent consensus that
the state should provide everyone with a minimum standard of living."
To some people, the rise of the welfare state was making the case for
progression less uneasy. Moreover, there appeared to be increasing
support for the notion that redistribution was a proper goal of taxation for
a variety of political reasons including the perceived link between
economic power and political power, and an alleged relationship between
affluence and poverty. To this line of argument, Blum had sharp rejoin-
ders: "The affluent do not have the economic power or means or
motivation to prevent individuals from rising above poverty."' 2 More-
over, a plan that taxes the rich in order to provide for the poor could, he
claimed, alter the character of society itself by changing the meaning of
private property. Whereas it had long been held that "a person is entitled
to his property but the government may take from him an amount that is
thought to be a fair sharing of the cost of discharging public functions,"
according to Blum the message of steep progression as a tool to transfer
wealth to the poor, "seems to be that an individual is entitled to keep only
that portion of his resources which the government decides not to take for
9. One wonders to what extent this book was part of the political agenda at Chicago. It was
started shortly after Hayek's libertarian call to arms: "Unless we can make the philosophic
foundations of a free society once more a living intellectual issue, and its implementation a task
which challenges the ingenuity and imagination of our liveliest minds, the prospects of freedom
are indeed dark." F.A. Hayek, "The Intellectuals and Socialism" (1948-49) 16 U. Chi. L. Rev.
417 at 433. Apparently Aaron Director did much to stimulate the researchers, see Blum and
Kalven, supra note 8 at viii. Also, as a matter of interest, it was warmly reviewed by John
Chamberlain, who had written the introduction to the American edition of Hayek' s The Road
to Serfdom and who personally viewed progressive taxation as legalized theft. He enthused that
Blum and Kalven's book had conferred "academic recognition" on "the intellectual sapping
operation against the progressive principle." J. Chamberlain, "Book Review" (1953-54) 21 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 502 at 502-503.
10. Supra note 8 at xxii, xxiii and 94.
11. W.J. Blum, "The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation in 1976," Occasional Papers
from The Law School, The University of Chicago, no. 11, (Nov. 19, 1976), reprinted in C.D.
Campbell, ed., Income Redistribution (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,
1977) 147.
12. Ibid. at 8 and 150.
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redistributional purposes."' 3 As Blum accurately observes, "[t]he posi-
tion that persons are 'entitled' to what they own is obviously a view about
justice."' 4 "Perhaps the entitlement principle of organization is not the
best one imaginable," he concedes, "[b]ut until a clearly better alternative
is developed and gains acceptability, actions that undermine it deserve to
be met with much skepticism."' 5 He concluded: "There is no escaping the
conclusion that a pattern of steep progression at high levels of taxation
does not blend comfortably into a society that heavily relies on traditional
notions of private property and private initiative as energizing focuses or
tools.'
16
In 1982, in once again re-assessing the uneasy case for progressive
taxation in the light of a decline in economic progress, a high rate of
inflation, an increase in welfare payments, and the expansion of the
government's role in society, for reasons that are easy to imagine given
the concerns he expressed in his earlier articles, Blum found the case even
more uneasy. 7 In part because of the philosophical case prepared by
Blum and Kalven, in the early 1980s the idea of flat taxes had become a
legitimate issue for public policy in the United States. Since then, it has
never been far below the surface of the political agenda.
At present, there is a bewildering array of proposals for fundamental
tax reform being considered in the United States, largely sponsored by
Republicans and business interests and their allied think-tanks. Some-
what surprisingly, most would replace the progressive income tax not
only with a flat rate tax, but with a flat rate consumption tax. Along with
what is referred to as the Hall-Rabushka flat tax, the options being
considered include a value added tax, a national retail sales tax and a
savings-exempt income tax. 18 Replacing the income tax with a.consump-
13. Ibid. at 14 and 154.
14. Ibid. at 16 and 155.
15. Ibid. at 16 and 155-56.
16. Ibid. at 16 and 156.
17. W.j. Blum, "Revisiting the Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation" (1982) 60 Taxes 16
at 21, reprinted in M.J. McIntyre, F.E.A. Sander & D. Westfall, eds., Readings in Federal
Taxation, 2d ed. (Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, 1983) 85 at 90 ("Subsequent
developments in our society have made [the case for progressive taxation]... no less, and
perhaps even more, uneasy.").
18. For descriptions of the various proposals see H.J. Aaron & W.G. Gale, eds., Economic
Effects ofFundamentalReform (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996); M.J. Boskin,
ed., Frontiers of Tax Reform (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1996); M.J. Graetz,
The Decline (and Fall?) of the Income Tax (New York: Norton, 1997) c. 14; J. Slemrod &
J. Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen's Guide to the Great Debate Over Tax Reform
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996) c. 7; A.S. Schenk, "The Plethora of Consumption Tax
Proposals: Putting the Value Added Tax, Flat Tax, Retail Sales Tax, and USA Tax into
Perspective" (1996) 33 San Diego L.
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tion tax is being urged largely on the grounds that exempting personal
savings from tax will greatly simplify the tax system and produce
efficiency gains. Of course the distributional effects of a switch from
income to consumption taxes are at least troublesome. A consumption tax
exempts income from capital from tax; most income from capital is
earned disproportionately by the wealthy.
What is commonly referred to as the flat tax in the United States is
generally a reference to a flat rate consumption tax proposed by two
economists from the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Robert
Hall and Alvin Rabushka. They originally proposed their flat tax in an
article in the Wall Street Journal in 1981. Their proposal would have
replaced the federal individual and corporate income tax with a two-part,
flat rate consumption tax; one part would be levied on the wages of
employees and the other part on the cash flow of businesses, minus
wages. They published a more detailed version of their proposal in their
1983 book, Low Tax, Simple Tax, Flat Tax. 9 The proposal was renamed
simply The Flat Tax in a slightly revised version published in 1985.
Capitalizing on the current interest in flat tax proposals a second edition
was published in 1995.20
In its economic effect, the Hall-Rabushka flat rate consumption tax is
basically equivalent to the Canadian Goods and Services Tax (GST);
however, there are two important design differences. First, the tax would
not be collected on individual transactions. Instead, businesses would
calculate their value added by simply subtracting their purchases of
material inputs and investment goods from their total sales. That is,
instead of calculating their value added using the credit-invoice method,
as they do under the GST, businesses would calculate their value added
using what is often referred to as the subtraction method. Second,
businesses would be able to deduct from their value added the payments
they made to employees as wages. Wages would then be taxed separately
in the hands of employees, but at the same rate that applied to businesses.
In essence, this flat consumption tax simply takes wages out of the value-
added tax (GST) base and taxes them in the hands of employees. The
reason that wages are taken out of the business value added calculation
Rev. 1281; L.B. Snyder & M. Gallegos, "Redefining the Role of the Federal Income Tax:
Taking the Tax Law 'Private' Through the Flat Tax and other Consumption Taxes" (1996) 13
Am. J. of Tax P. 1; E. Toder, "Consumption Tax Proposals in the United States" in R. Krever,
ed., Tax Conversations: A Guide to the Key Issues in the Tax Reform Debate: Essays in Honour
of John G. Head (London: Kluwer, 1997) 159.
19. R. E. Hall & A. Rabushka, Low Tax, Simple Tax, Flat Tax (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1983).
20. R. E. Hall & A. Rabushka, The Flat Tax, 2d ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995).
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is to allow a basic exemption from tax to be provided directly to
employees. Thus, unlike the GST, which taxes all value added at a flat rate
of 7 percent, the Hall-Rabushka flat tax could exempt wages under a
certain amount from tax. Hall and Rubushka argue that this is a much
simpler and more efficient method of relieving low-income families of
part of the tax burden than other methods, such as the refundable sales tax
credit used under the GST.2' Although the flat tax may appear to resemble
an income tax because individuals file and pay taxes, the flat tax is a type
of consumption tax because returns on savings and investment are not
taxed and business investments are expensed. In their book on the flat tax,
Hall and Rabushka propose a 19 percent rate on individuals and busi-
nesses, and set the exempt level of income at $9,500 for a single taxpayer
and, for example, for a family of four, at $25,500 for 1995. They claim
that this rate would raise as much revenue as the current U.S. tax system.
The Hall-Rabushka flat tax formed the basis of a number of flat tax
proposals introduced in Congress in the early 1980s. 22 In 1992, it surfaced
again when Democratic presidential candidate and former California
Governor, Jerry Brown, made headlines by advocating a plan to replace
the entire federal tax system with a 13 percent flat-rate individual income
tax and a 13 percent value added tax.23 At first his plan garnered
considerable media attention, but once it became obvious how regressive
it would be both Brown and his proposal slid from view. Many commen-
tators compared it unfavourably to the Hall-Rabushka plan.
Most recently, the flat tax hit the public consciousness in the United
States after the Republicans took control of Congress following the 1994
elections. Representative Richard Armey, Majority Leader of the
U.S. House of Representatives, and Senator Richard Shelby, introduced
a bill in congress in 1995 based upon the Hall-Rabushka plan, the
Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995.14 Their plan would
replace the individual and corporate income taxes and the estate and gift
taxes with a flat rate tax of 17 percent on individual wages, with a personal
21. For a discussion of some of the likely long-term differences between a subtraction-
method value added tax and the Hall-Rabushka flat tax see K.C. Burke, "VATs and Flat Taxes
Reconsidered" (1996) 70 Tax Notes (February 12) 899; and L. Zelenak, "Hat Tax vs. VAT:
Progressivity and Family Allowances" (1995) 69 Tax Notes (November 27) 1129.
22. See D.R. Burton, "Major Tax Reform Proposals at a Glance" (1985) 26 Tax Notes
(January 7) 75; R.V. Beaudry, "The Flat Rate Tax: Is It a Viable Solution to the Crisis Facing
the Internal Revenue Code?" (1984) 9 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 219.
23. For a discussion of the Brown proposal see E. Steuerle, "Flat Taxes and Tax Simplication"
(1992) 55 Tax Notes (April 20) 405 and "Flat Taxes" (1992) 55 Tax Notes (April 6) 125.
24. Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1997, HR 2040, 105th Cong., Ist sess., March
12, 1997. Details of the tax and the efforts to promote it can be found at the Web site [http://
www.flattax.house.gov].
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exemption of, for example, $33,800 for a family of four, and a tax on
businesses at the same rate. Further support for the plan was garnered in
1996 when a Tax Reform Commission appointed by then Senate Majority
Leader Robert Dole and House Speaker Newt Gingrich, and headed by
former Representative Jack Kemp, wrote sympathetically about a flat rate
consumption tax along the same general lines as the Armey-Shelby
plan.25 The Kemp committee, which reported in January 1996, did not
expressly endorse a flat tax to avoid embarrassing Bob Dole, who was at
the time the front-runner in the Republican presidential candidate race
and was concerned about alienating middle-class voters. It merely put
forward a set of principles to be followed in replacing the Internal
Revenue Code. However, the report did say that a flat tax would simplify
the code and lead to an "explosion" of new investment and economic
growth.
At the same time, publisher Steve Forbes made a version of the Armey-
Shelby flat tax the centerpiece, indeed almost the only plank, of his bid
for the 1996 Republican presidential nomination. To provide a sense of
the enmity that flat taxers display towards progressive taxation, in
introducing his flat tax proposal he exclaimed:
No one outside Washington could have devised something more complex,
more corrupting, more un-understandable, more anti-growth, more anti-
family, a dead weight on life in America, than the tax code today. There
is only one thing to do. That is to scrap the system, drive a stake through
its heart, kill it, bury it, hope it never rises again to terrorise the American
people.2
6
In addition to a somewhat mean-spirited disposition, those who support
the flat tax appear to have a zeal for shameless rhetoric. Although his plan
at first seemed popular, and momentarily vaulted him from a fringe
candidate to an apparently serious contender for the Republican presiden-
tial nomination, it soon faded from view and Steve Forbes along with it.
He fell from political contention almost as quickly as he rose and
withdrew from the nomination race. However, he is still pushing the idea
of flat taxes as the honorary chair of the organization, Americans for
Hope, Growth, and Opportunity.
Several proposals for flat taxes are at present winding their way
through Congress. However, the Armey-Shelby plan remains the leading
contender. The Congressional House Majority Leader, Richard Armey,
kicked off his most recent campaign to "Scrap the Code" last fall. At the
25. National Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform, Unleashing America's
Potential: A Pro-Growth, Pro-Family Tax System for the 21st Century (1996), reprinted in 70
Tax Notes (January 22) 413.
26. Quoted in H. Hertzberg, "Banana Republican" The New Yorker (19 February 1996) 50.
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press conference he threw sections of the Internal Revenue Code into a
trash can and described the income tax as "oppressive, counter-produc-
tive, annoying and unfair" and predicted that "[t]he current code will be
road kill before you know it."27 Although it is not now attracting much
public attention, the flat tax remains an important issue on the political
and think-tank circuits in the US.2"
This brief review does not do justice to the immense energy that has
gone into proposing and attempting to sell flat taxes in the United States,
nor the enormous technical, transitional and other problems such taxes
present, particularly when there is an effort not only to flatten the rate but
also to shift the base from income to consumption. 29 The review was
primarily meant to provide some context for the following discussion of
flat taxes in Canada.
3. Canada: Reaching for the Moon, Landing in the United States
Tax developments in the United States are always significant for Cana-
dians since Canada tends to borrow most of its ideas about tax reform
from the United States. Even Canada's major tax reform effort in 1972,
27. J. Rieschick, "GOP Lawmakers Step Up Efforts to Turn Tax Code Into 'Road Kill"'
(1997) 76 Tax Notes (September 29) 1661.
28. In the United States, the competing think-tanks are waging a debate over the flat tax on
the Internet. Although the sites are numerous, for illustrative offerings, compare those at the
left-of-centre Economic Policy Institute, see for example M. Sawicky, "Falling Flat: The
Dubious Case for the Flat Tax" Issue Brief #110 (1996) [http://epn.org/epi/epsawi.html] and
the Progressive Foundation, see for example R.J. Shapiro, "Why Fairness Matters: Progressive
Versus Flat Taxes" [http://www.dlcppi.org/economic.htm] with the material at the site of the
right-of-centre Heritage Foundation, see for example D.J. Mitchell, "A New Tax System:
Simple, Fair, and Flat" [http://taxation.org]. Jonathan Chait, a columnist for the New Republic,
has noted that Daniel Mitchell, the author of this latter tract, is "a fellow from the Heritage
Foundation whose sole apparent function is to monitor the print media for insufficiently
obsequious references to the sanctity of capital gains and to respond angrily, always taking care
to end his letters with a ringing endorsement of the flat tax." J. Chait, "Washington Diarist:
Going Postal" The New Republic (3 November 1997). For a comprehensive bibliography on
the flat tax debate in the United States over the past two decades, complied by a strong
proponent of flat taxes, see Bruce Bartlett, "Tax Reform: Flat Rate Tax Bibliography"
[http://www.taxation.org/heritage/taxsite/taxlist.html].
29. See for example J.M. Bickley, "Flat Tax: An Overview of The Hall-Rabushka Proposal"
(1996) 72 Tax Notes (July 1) 97; A.L. Feld, "Living With the Flat Tax" (1995) 48 Nat'l Tax
J. 603; J.C. Flemming Jr., "Scoping Out the Uncertain Simplification (Complication?) Effects
of VATs, BATs, and Consumed Income Effects" (1995) 2 Fla. Tax Rev. 390. 1 do not deal at
all with the many issues relating to a tax mix shift from income to consumption in this paper.
I have discussed my reservations about such a tax mix change at length in a monograph about
the GST. N. Brooks, The Canadian Goods and Services Tax: History, Policy, and Politics
(Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1992). Later in this paper, in discussing the
incentive effects of reducing tax rates, I have borrowed liberally arguments and even
paragraphs from this monograph.
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that was initiated with the magnificent report of the Royal Commission
on Taxation in 1967, and followed 5 years of intense public debate, has
been described by Richard Bird and Meyer Bucovetsky as "reaching for
the moon and landing, more or less, in the United States."3 The business
press is fond of warning that Canada must remain tax competitive with the
United States. Certainly, many commentators believe that if the United
States were to enact a flat tax, Canada would have little choice but to
follow suit.3' Not surprisingly, the political interest in Canada for flat
taxes parallelled the two bursts of interest in the United States, first in the
early 1980s and then again in the mid-1990s.
As a footnote to Canadian flat tax history, one of the first published
proposals for a flat tax in Canada was made by Kenneth Eaton in his
posthumously published Essays in Taxation.32 Eaton had spent over
twenty-five years in the Department of Finance, retiring in 1958. For
most of these years he was Assistant Deputy Minister and chief tax
adviser to Ministers of Finance. In his essay chapter on the personal
income tax he launches into a sustained and bitter attack on progressive
taxation. Although he seems to suggest that he personally favoured a poll
tax, or a tax in which everyone paid the same amount, he notes that a flat
tax rate of 17 percent could replace the existing progressive rates. He
alleges the following benefits would follow the adoption of a flat rate:
It would restore incentives to work harder and better .... The middle and
upper income groups would have enough left after tax to acquire greater
ownership of Canadian industry .... Highly trained.Canadians could do
better for themselves at home than abroad .... The incentive to cheat on
income tax would largely disappear.... Canadians in the income brackets
who would benefit from a proportional tax in their improved economic
position might give deeper thought to a manner of living. Cultured
Canadians might develop among themselves a Canadian culture and
encourage the same among the rest of us which would please nearly
everybody .... Technically, the income tax could be greatly simplified.33
He also suggests that the only explanation for progressive taxation is
political expediency, under which the majority of low-and middle-
income voters support social programs that they benefit from and then
30. M. Bucovetsky & R.M. Bird, "Tax Reform in Canada: A Progress Report" (1972) 25
Nat'l Tax J. 15 at 39.
31. G. Ip, "U.S. tax proposals challenge Canada" The Financial Post (16 September 1995)
8; B. McKenna, "Could flat tax spread to Canada? Radical changes to American system would
leave 'no choice' for northern neighbour" The Globe and Mail (17 January 1996) B2;
P. Morton, "Canada might be pressured to follow American flat-tax initiative" The Financial
Post (18 January 1996) 9.
32. A.K. Eaton, Essays in Taxation (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1966).
33. Ibid. at 31-32.
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make high-income taxpayers bear their cost. Furthermore progressive
taxation is arbitrary in the sense that "it is inconsistent with the concept
of private property."34 Although he does not make a reference to their
monograph, it appears that Eaton was greatly influenced by Blum and
Kalven' s Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation.35
Following the initial burst of enthusiasm for flat taxes in the United
States in the early 1980s, a number of political contenders and politicians
attempted to test the waters in Canada. Peter Pocklington, an Alberta
business person, made it a central plank in his campaign for the Progres-
sive Conservative leadership in 1983. About the same time, John Evans,
a Liberal Member of Parliament, and Chair of the House of Commons
Finance Committee, proposed a variant of the flat tax. However, it has
been the Fraser Institute, a right-wing think-tank, that has been largely
responsible for putting and keeping the idea of a flat tax on the political
agenda in Canada. In the early 1980s, the director of the Institute, Michael
Walker, published a booklet that stated the case for flat taxes and
summarized the various proposals that were then current, including the
many legislative proposals in the United States.36 He concluded:
Our final conclusion on the basis of this preliminary assessment must be
that a flat-rate tax system is certainly feasible, that it would produce a
certain amount of perverse redistribution of the tax burden but that the
extent of this redistribution is likely to be less than is often imagined ....
It is unambiguously the case that a flat-rate tax would reduce the disincen-
tive to work and productivity imposed by the existing tax system and, on
balance, seems to be a direction for reform which deserves the careful
consideration of Canadian policymakers.37
This interest in the flat tax at the time is reflected in the fact that the
Canadian Tax Foundation had a paper delivered at its 1982 annual tax
conference on the flat-rate tax. The Foundation invited an American,
Joseph Minarik, the Deputy Assistant Director, Tax Analysis Division,
Congressional Budget Office, to summarize the proposals being put
forward in the United States.38 He concluded his review by noting that the
aspect of the proposed flat taxes that involved broadening the tax base
seemed worthwhile, but that "[I]n contrast to broadening the tax base, the
flat tax rate comes out looking rather, well, flat."39
34. Ibid. at 27.
35. Supra note 8.
36. M.A. Walker, On Flat-Rate Tax Proposals (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1983).
37. Ibid. at 38.
38. J.J. Minarik, "A Flat Rate Income Tax for Canada?" in Report of the Proceedings of the
Thirty-Fourth Tax Conference, 1982 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation,
1993) 37.
39. Ibid. at 51.
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Throughout the mid and late 1980s, although there was little public
attention paid to flat taxes, Canadian academics continued to examine the
subject. In a review of public revenues and public policy at a tax
conference sponsored by the Fraser Institute, Doug Auld, a public finance
economist from the University of Guelph, concluded that a flat rate tax
of 21.6 percent of assessed personal income could replace the federal
personal, corporate and sales tax. Among other things, he suggested that,
"[p]rogressive rates of taxation were largely a feature of wartime taxa-
tion. It was deemed improper at that time for individuals to receive very
high incomes as a consequence ofthe war effort. ' '40 Another economist,
Roger Smith, Dean of the Faculty of Business at the University of
Alberta, also endorsed a flat tax. He argued Canada was much better
placed than the United States to adopt a flat rate tax since in Canada if the
tax base were broadened and the tax rate flattened there would not be
nearly as large a shift in the tax burden from higher income classes to
middle income classes as there would be in the United States.4 His
general assessment of flat taxes was that, "[b]roadening the base and
applying a flat tax rate can increase the perception of fairness, reduce
costly distortions created by high marginal rates, have a negligible effect
on the overall progressivity of the tax system, and raise the same amount
of revenue.42
The flat tax became a political issue again during the public discussion
of the implementation of the GST. Dennis Mills, a Liberal MP from
Toronto, was the prime mover. He proposed that the federal sales and
income taxes be replaced with a flat tax of 25 percent, applicable to both
individuals and businesses. His proposed 25 percent rate was revenue
neutral only because he assumed, without any evidence, that substantial
increased economic activity would follow from a lower tax rate for high
income individuals. Moreover, in drafting the technical details of his
proposal, which was essentially a flat rate income tax, he and his
researchers borrowed many ideas from the Hall-Rabushka flat tax with-
out apparently realizing that it was a flat consumption tax. Consequently,
many of the technical details are incoherent. Since he was a Liberal,
40. D.A.L. Auld, "Public Revenues and Public Policy: The Impact on the Canadian
Economy" in J.M. Buchanan, W. Block & M. Walker, eds., Taxation: An International
Perspective (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1984) c. 4 at 100-101.
41. R.S. Smith, "Flat Rate Tax Potential: A Preliminary Comparison of Three Countries"
(1986) 34 Can. T.J. 835.
42. R.S. Smith, "Rates of Personal Income Tax - The CarterCommission Revisited" in W.N.
Brooks, ed., The Quest for Tax Reform: The Royal Commission on Taxation Twenty Years
Later (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 173 at 183.
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perhaps to obscure it origins, and right-wing connections, he called his tax
proposal, "The Single Tax," instead of a flat tax. Although originally
published in 1990, 43 his proposal has undergone several republications
over the years.' He continues to trumpet it on every suitable occasion.
Following the resurgent interest in flat taxes in the United States in the
early 1990s, a parallel resurgence of interest emerged in Canada. The
Fraser Institute held a one-day flat tax conference in Toronto in 1995.
However, much of the drive for a flat tax is now coming from the Reform
Party. In 1995, the party asked two of its most prominent Members of
Parliament, Herbert Grubel and Jim Silye, to prepare a detailed proposal
on flat taxes for consideration at the party's biannual assembly of
delegates in June 1996. In a paper prepared by these members, along with
Ken Boessenkool, an economist from the party's research department,
that was first presented at the Fraser Institute conference in October 1995,
and then presented to the Reform Party delegates, the authors set out two
alternative approaches to a flat tax.45 The first approach was favoured by
Herbert Grubel and called the Pure Flat Tax. It is a consumption tax that
essentially eliminates the tax on income from property. The paper asserts
that the model has been adapted "to reflect the Canadian fiscal and
institutional environment,"4 6 however, it is almost impossible to discern
anything Canadian about it. It is almost identical to the flat tax proposed
by Hall and Rabushka in the United States. In the paper the authors claim
that the Canadian tax system must be closely integrated with the Ameri-
can system.
The second approach, favoured by Jim Silye, who found the first
approach too radical, was called the Proportional Flat Tax, and was
inspired, the paper notes, by the work of Dennis Mills. However, the
paper goes on to observe that the Proportional Flat Tax "is more radical
than that of Mills because it has fewer deductions from income, allows the
same rate of taxation for personal and business income and provides for
the elimination of the GST."47 Also, it notes that the proposed rates for the
Proportional Flat tax are revenue neutral, whereas the Mills proposal
would create a large deficit.
At the Reform Party's biannual Assembly of delegates in June, 1996,
although a party task force had endorsed the Pure Flat Tax, the party did
43. D. Mills, The Single Tax (Toronto: Hemlock Press, 1990).
44. See his Web site at [http://www.singletax.com/single.html].
45. K. Boessenkool, H. Grubel & J. Silye,"A Flat Tax for Canada" (The Flat Tax Conference,
Fraser Institute, 31 October 1995) [unpublished; available at http://www.reform.ca].
46. Ibid. at 1-2.
47. Ibid. at 10.
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not commit itself to either version of the flat tax.48 Apparently, the party
executive had some reservations about endorsing the Hall-Rabushka
model and Jim Silye, an influential party member, continued to press for
his less radical version. In retrospect, Herbert Grubel has noted that the
failure to commit to either plan was a useful political ploy since the
confusion prevented the government from discrediting "our own analysis
of incidence, costs, and benefits of specific proposals. ' '49 In more recent
discussion papers the Reform Party has not committed itself to a flat tax
but only tax cuts and reduced high marginal tax rates."
Just to round out this story about the fate, so far, of the flat tax in
Canada, in late 1995 and early 1996, particularly after Malcolm Forbes
appeared to have some success with the idea of a flat tax in the United
States, the Canadian media was full of stories about the flat tax. Canada's
weekly news magazine, Maclean's, ran a lead story about flat taxes.5" The
editorial board,52 and most of the columnists at The Financial Post, have
written stories supporting flat taxes. 3 The Globe and Mail columnists
48. Herbert Grubel recounts the development of these proposals and the subsequent politics
in a panel discussion, G.P. O'Driscoll, Jr., et al., "Tax Reform" (1997) 15 Contemp. Econ.
Pol'y I at 3-6.
49. Ibid. at 5.
50. See "Beyond A Balanced Budget: A Discussion of the Options for Debt Retirement, Tax
Relief and Responsible Future Spending" prepared by the Office of the Official Opposition of
Canada, September 11, 1997 [http://www.reform.calbabb/index.html].
51. M. Janigan, "Flat-Tax Flak" Maclean's (19 February 1996) 34.
52. Editorial, "Flattax deserves a close look" The Financial Post (20 January 1996) 16.
53. D. Francis, "Flat taxes the way to end vicious evasion circle" The Financial Post
(21 August 1993) S3; J. Geddes, "Floating the flat-tax balloon over a tax-weary Canada" The
FinancialPost (I July 1995) 1; N. Nankivell, "Flat-rate federal income tax would be better than
existing system" The Financial Post (15 June 1995) 15. Somewhat interestingly, one of The
Financial Post's former contributing editors, who regularly wrote on tax issues, expressed
repeated scepticism about the wisdom and politics of a flat tax. See Samuel Slutsky, "Flat tax
means rich get richer and poor get taxed" The Financial Post (15 August 1995) 25 and "Flat
tax blocked by reality" The Financial Post (25 June 1996) 28. However, every time he wrote
a column critical of flat taxes he was blasted by letters to the editor. In part to further show the
complexities and deep-rooted ideologies at stake in the flat tax debate, after one column, in
which he suggested that the flat tax was attractive but unworkable because it would mean that
tax incentives, such as the tax credits for charities, that were both worthwhile and supported
by politically powerful groups, would have to be removed, he was severely taken to task in a
letterto the editor from Reuven Brenner, the Directorof the McGill Economics Centre. Brenner
first questioned, "[w]hat can [Slutsky] be talking about" when he asserts that charities are the
"largest single organized group doing good in any societies" and therefore deserve a tax break?
Brenner pointed out that, "[t]he facts that I am acquainted with are that cheaper shoes and
vaccines manufactured by profit-motivated companies have saved farmore lives than the much
publicized actions of all the Mother Teresas combined. How much good charities do, is
certainly a matter open for debate." However, he did agree that it was unlikely that a flat tax
would ever be enacted, but not for the reasons that Slutsky gave. He asserted: "The main reason
is not that accountants, lawyers and many other groups have the incentive to lobby against it,
but that politicans know that such a tax destroys their power. In the absence of military threats,
Flattening the Claims of the Flat Taxers
have written in support of the tax but, interestingly, the editorial board of
The Globe and Mail is at least equivocal about the idea of flat taxes.54 In
April, 1995, they suggested that the flat tax proposals being considered
in the United States ought to be one of the policy ideas the federal
Progressive Conservative party consider in order to rejuvenate itself.55
However, almost a year later, in an editorial titled, "Flat tax, flat earth,"
they expressed reservations about a flat tax, although their main concern
appeared to be not with the idea of the flat tax itself but proposals that at
the same time offered a tax cut with the promise that it would spur
sufficient economic activity to pay for the tax cut.56 The editorial referred
to the Republican's "infatuation" with the flat tax to be "no less foolish
than the one they have long had with supply-side economics.157 It went
on to note that "the belief the GDP growth rate can be quickly doubled
through tax cuts, as a Republican Party commission headed by Jack
Kemp asserted last month, is one more trip into the land of voodoo
economics."58 Some columnists, particularly those at The Toronto Star,
have been critical of the flat tax; for example, Dalton Camp asserted that,
"[i]t doesn't fit the needs of our economy and it doesn't suit our society
- not because it's someone else's idea, but because it's not our idea of
what tax reform needs to be about. Having to choose between a tax system
that encourages anarchy, and another that encourages an oligarchy, is no
choice at all."59
The most recent proposal for a flat-rate direct consumption tax in
Canada has been made by Jonathan Kesselman, an economist at the
University of British Columbia. He has suggested that the GST be
replaced with such a tax.' His proposal is very similar to the Hall-
Rabushka proposal to replace the income tax with a flat-rate direct-
consumption tax, however, since he is suggesting only replacing the GST
the power of politicans comes from little more than selling and closing tax loopholes. They will
never pull the carpet out from under their own feet." R. Brenner, Letter to the Editor, The
Financial Post (8 September 1995) 12.
54. See A. Coyne, "Flat tax can also be fairtax" The Globe and Mail (22 February 1996) B16;
and P. Cook, "Flatter taxes, or flattened politicians" The Globe and Mail (12 February 1996)
B7.
55. Editorial, "Ideas for a Conservative revival (1)" The Globe andMail (24 April 1995) A14.
56. Editorial, "Flat tax, flat earth (I)" The Globe and Mail (2 February 1996) A12; "Flattax,
flat earth (II)" The Globe and Mail (3 February 1996) D6.
57. "Flattax, flat earth (I)," ibid. at A12.
58. Ibid.
59. D. Camp, "Flattax doesn't belong in true north, strong and frozen" The Toronto Star
(17 January 1996) A17.
60. J.R. Kesselman, General Payroll Taxes: Economics, Politics, and Design (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1997) c. 8.
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with such a tax, and not the income tax, it could be levied at a much lower
rate, as low as 3 percent, and thus avoid many of the transitional and
distributional consequences of the Hall-Rabushka proposal.
This is not the place to assess the Hall-Rabushka type flat rate
consumption tax as an option for Canada, except to note that aside from
the inequity and dubious economic benefits of consumption taxes, the tax
itself, in any of its many guises, is replete with complexities and
transitional problems and would be unlikely to lead to much simplifica-
tion for the average taxpayer. It would, of course, simplify paying taxes
for wealthy individuals by simply exempting dividends, interest income
and capital gains from tax. It is no trick to simplifying any law by
abolishing it. Also, I doubt that when average Canadians suggest the tax
system should be simplified they mean taxes should simply be repealed
on forms of income received primarily by high-income Canadians, or that
when Canadians suggest the many loopholes for capital income should be
dealt with they mean those loopholes should be converted into one all-
encompassing loophole.
III. Clarifying the Issues
The proponents of flat taxes make a number of beguiling claims. First,
they argue that a flat tax rate will greatly simplify the income tax by
making it easier to understand, more convenient to comply with, and less
expensive to administer. They also argue a flat tax rate will substantially
reduce tax avoidance and evasion. Second, in addition to administrative
advantages, a flat tax rate will have significant economic benefits. It will
increase the living standards of all Canadians by encouraging taxpayers,
particularly rich and able Canadians, to work harder, save more, and
undertake more entrepreneurial activities and risky investments. It will
also encourage talented Canadians to remain in Canada and not migrate
to more tax-hospitable climates. Third, flat taxers contend that a flat tax
will have significant political advantages. It will increase the transpar-
ency of the tax system by reducing the futility and hypocrisy of high rates,
make abolishing tax loopholes politically easier by reducing their value
to high-income taxpayers, and constrain high government expenditures
by ensuring that all voters share the costs of such expenditures in the same
proportion. Finally, proponents make a fairness argument for flat taxes;
namely, that only a tax system in which everyone pays the same
proportion of their income in tax can make a claim of treating everyone
equally.
All of these arguments are dead wrong - their logic is faulty, their
factual premises are not supported by the weight of empirical evidence,
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and their normative judgments are perverse. The only significant effect
of a flat tax rate will be to shift even more wealth and power to the already
wealthy and powerful. Moreover, a flat tax is contrary to the basic
principles of an equitable tax system and the social goals of Canadians.
A cardinal principle of tax fairness in Canada has always been that those
with greater ability to pay should pay a larger percentage of their income
in tax than those with less ability to pay. A widely accepted social goal
of Canadians is that governments should use the tax/transfer system to
achieve a more socially acceptable distribution of income than that which
results from unrestrained market forces. As John Geddes has claimed,
"it]he concept of a flat tax, like the notion of a flat earth, is a triumph of
simple-mindedness over reality."'"
Before refuting the claims made by the flat taxers, three preliminary
points need to be made to clarify the issues since flat taxers have
deliberately misconceptualized the terms of the debate over tax rates.
First, the precise definition of a flat tax needs to be clarified since the tax
design that flat taxers are generally proposing is not clearly indicated by
the phrase "a flat tax." Second, the concept of flat taxes needs to be
distinguished from other concepts that flat taxers frequently attempt to
conflate along with a flat tax rate in order to make flat taxes appear
intuitively appealing. Finally, flat taxers normally address their argu-
ments only to the income tax and ignore the other tax bases in the tax
system and other government policy instruments that have important
redistributional consequences. As a result, to some degree, the whole idea
of flat taxes is conceptually incoherent, at least when its adoption is being
urged on grounds of fairness. As commonly used by its advocates, the
term 'flat tax' is highly misleading. Flat taxers are not normally advocat-
ing a flat tax in the sense that everyone' s tax liability should be the same;
that is, that the tax itself should be flat. Economists refer to a tax in which
everyone pays the same amount as a lump-sum tax. When levied, it is
usually assessed as a poll tax. Experience with poll taxes, most recently
in the guise of the British "community charge," reveals them to be
difficult to administer and, most tellingly, in violation of almost every
citizen's sense of fairness. The attempt to levy a poll tax was largely
responsible for the fall of a Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
Margaret Thatcher.62 It is the rate of tax, rather than tax liability, that does
61. J. Geddes, "Flat-tax debate is not about simplification after all" The Financial Post
(27 January 1996) 20.
62. See J. Gibson, The Politics and Economics of the Poll Tax: Mrs. Thatcher's Downfall
(Warley, U.K.: Emas, 1990) and D. Butler, A. Adonis & T. Travers, Failure in British
Government: The Politics of the Poll Tax (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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not change as income increases under most proposed flat taxes. Under
most proposals, a single rate of tax would replace the graduated tax rates
in the present income tax system.
However, even to call most proposed flat taxes single-rate taxes is
misleading. Flat tax proposals invariably exempt a certain amount of
income from taxation. For that reason, they are, in fact, a form of
graduated tax, with an initial bracket to which a zero tax rate applies, and
then an open-ended bracket above this amount subject to a single rate of
tax. A single-rate tax with an exemption is more accurately referred to as
a dual-rate tax system than a single-rate system.
The proponents of flat taxes presumably do not refer to their proposals
as dual-rate taxes because then it would be clear that conceptually their
proposals are not so different from the present progressive tax system. On
its face, not too much could turn on whether a tax system has two or four
rates, as does the present Canadian tax system. Indeed collapsing the rates
from four to two would not affect most people. Under the present
progressive rate structure, almost 70 percent of tax filers are in the bottom
two brackets. They have taxable incomes of under $30,000.63 Essentially,
the system is already flat for them. Thus whatever the advantages of the
so-called flat-rate system, it will only accrue to the top 30 percent of
income earners who are now in the top two brackets. Put this way, that is
by referring to the proposed system as a two-rate system, which would
replace the present four-rate system, makes it more obvious what the
exercise is all about, namely, reducing the taxes paid by high-income
individuals. Proponents likely call their proposal a flat tax so that it
sounds like a radical new idea that must mean more than simply reducing
tax rates for a relatively small percentage of the population who happen
to have high incomes.
Contrary to the suggestion implicit in a reference to a flat tax, a dual-
rate income tax is progressive. Assume that a flat-tax proposal exempts
the first $10,000 of an individual's income from tax and then levies a
20 percent rate on the excess. Individuals earning $20,000 would pay
20 percent of their income in excess of $10,000 in tax, or $2,000, which
would be an effective rate of tax on their earnings of 10 percent. At
$50,000 they would pay $8,000 in tax, for an effective rate of 16 percent.
At $100,000, the effective rate of tax would be 18 percent. Thus because
of the exemption, the tax would be progressive, particularly over lower-
income ranges. As the exemption becomes a smaller percentage of the
income of individuals the rate becomes essentially proportional. The
63. Revenue Canada, Tax Statistics on Individuals: 1995 Tax Year (Ottawa: Revenue
Canada, 1997), Basic Table 2.
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point is that a flat tax is progressive,just not very progressive, particularly
over high-income ranges. Again, presumably the reason that flat taxers do
not advertise the progressive nature of flat taxes is because then it
becomes obvious that what the debate is about is what rates of tax should
apply to high-income individuals. That is likely to be a less interesting
proposition for most middle-class individuals than the promise of a
radical new tax system.
But if the real agenda of flat taxers is simply to reduce taxes for the rich,
and a necessary result of their gambit is the middle-class will get soaked,
how do flat taxers convince the average individual that flat taxes are a
good idea? They have attempted to do so by conflating a number of
unrelated issues, namely, rate reductions for high-income individuals
with a broadened tax base, overall tax reductions and simplicity.
The most effective, but misleading, strategy of flat taxers has been to
link reducing the tax rates with broadening the tax base. That is, they
contend that what flat taxes are all about is getting rid of tax loopholes,
particularly those that benefit the rich, and then flattening the rates. Yet
expanding the tax base has no necessary connection with reducing tax
rates. The scope of the tax base and the shape of the tax rate structure are
conceptually distinct issues. The tax base could be expanded and the rates
left as they are or even made more progressive. The reasons why flat
taxers attempt to conflate these issues is obvious. Many of the advantages
they claim for their flat rate proposals, such as simplicity, follow not from
flattening the rate structure but from broadening the tax base.
Second, flat taxers attempt to link reduced tax rates with tax cuts. If tax
rates are to be reduced for high-income individuals, and low-income
individuals are to be exempt from tax by a large basic exemption, how is
it possible that middle-income individuals will not get soaked? The only
possible answer is if the flat-rate tax system raises less revenue than the
current one. Most flat taxers frankly acknowledge that a flat tax could not
be sold unless the bottom line is tax relief. Well, if the presumed outcome
is lower taxes for everyone, and no connection is made between reduced
taxes and reduced public services, a tax reform based upon anything from
the weight of taxpayers to average local rainfall could likely be sold by
any political party - no trick there. A more revealing test of any proposed
change is how it compares with the present system when the assumption
is made that it must bring in the same amount of revenue. Tax cuts have
nothing whatever to do with the merits, if any, of a flat tax. If reduced
taxes for everyone were the objective, it could easily be achieved without
at the same time providing a big tax break for the rich by flattening the tax
rates. The fairest way to reduce income taxes is to simply increase the
basic exemption.
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The purpose of muddling these issues - base broadening, the overall
level of taxes and flat rates - is obvious. It is a way to get middle-class
political support for what amounts to a huge tax reduction for the rich.
Many people are in favour of removing loopholes, particularly those they
do not benefit from, and some people are in favour of a tax cut. But the
great majority of Canadians, as public opinion poll after poll has shown,
think the rich should pay more not less tax. Therefore, the only way the
proponents of flat taxes think they can sell their tax reform is by
suggesting these issues are inextricably linked.
Finally, by way of clarifying the issues in the flat tax debate, it is
important to note that for a number of reasons there is an important sense
in which the whole ideal of flattening the income tax rates is conceptually
incoherent, at least if it is being urged on grounds of fairness. First, even
if members of a political party thought that everyone should pay the same
percentage of their income in tax, on the basis of some misguided fairness
argument, they could not be in favour of a flat-rate income tax. The reason
for this is that high-income individuals tend to receive all sorts of income
that will never be taxed under any broadened income tax base politically
imaginable. For example, the present income tax does not include in its
base, and no flat rate tax proposal I have seen has proposed including,
such items of income as gifts and bequests (which are received almost
exclusively by high-income individuals), accrued capital gains (which
are earned almost exclusively by high-income individuals), or the im-
puted rental value of homes (a form of income received disproportion-
ately by higher-income individuals). In fact, if a broad measure of income
that includes these amounts is used, even Canada's existing progressive
income tax rate structure does not lead to much progressivity at high-
income levels, and for incomes over $300,000 the present system is
actually regressive. Families with broad income of $150,000 to $300,000
pay on average about 16 percent of their income in income tax, while
those with income over $300,000 only pay 14.5 percent.64
Second, even if the income tax base could be broadened so that it was
completely comprehensive, and for reasons of fairness a political party
thought that everyone should pay the same percentage of their income in
tax, they could still not be in favour of a flat-rate income tax. The reason
for this is that the income tax is only one of many taxes in the overall tax
system and it is the only progressive tax. All other taxes, such as sales
taxes, property taxes, and excise taxes, under the most reasonable
64. F. Vermaeten, W.I. Gillespie & A. Vermaeten, "Tax Incidence in Canada" (1994) Can.
T.J. 348 at 375.
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incidence assumptions, are regressive, that is, low-income individuals
pay a larger percentage of their income in these taxes than high-income
individuals. It is difficult to think of a reason for being concerned, on
grounds of fairness, that everyone pay the same proportionate amount of
their income in income tax, but being indifferent to the fact low-income
individuals pay a much larger percentage of their income in these other
regressive taxes than high-income individuals. If it is fair that everyone
pay the same percentage of their income in taxes, the income tax has to
be progressive simply to offset the regressivity of the other taxes in the
tax system. Flat taxers should, in fact, be content with the present system
since under the present tax system practically every family, no matter
what their income, pays about 35 percent of their income, broadly
defined, in tax. Low-income families pay about 30 percent of their
income broadly defined in tax. The percentage of their income paid in tax
increases slightly for families until their income reaches about $50,000
at which point they pay about 34 percent of their income in tax. However,
beyond this middle-income range taxes paid as a percentage of income
remains about the same.65
Finally, there is an even more fundamental reason why arguments for
flat taxes based on some notion of fairness are utterly conceptually
incoherent. This is the reason. Any argument that suggests that the
redistributive consequences of tax laws should be constrained for reasons
of fairness, by flattening the rates, necessarily rests upon the assumption
that conceptually the distributive consequences of tax laws are somehow
different than the distributive consequences of other government regula-
tory regimes including the rules of property and contract laws. But, of
course, this is nonsense. Every form of government regulation has
distributive consequences. Providing professionals such as doctors and
lawyers with a monopoly necessarily results in significant beneficial
redistributive consequences in their favour; regulations providing inven-
tors with the exclusive right to exploit their patented inventions for a
number of years has made billionaires out of some; and health, safety and
consumer regulations often disproportionately affect the income of
lower-income families.
In addition to more overt forms of government regulations, the
background rules of property and contract law that govern market place
transactions also have important, but unintended, distributional conse-
quences. What economists often refer to as a self-regulating, neutral and
free market place is, in fact, comprised of legal rights and commercial
65. Ibid. at 372.
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exchanges that are created and regulated by a seamless web of rules,
standards, distinctions and judgements that collectively constitute the
rules of property, contract and tort law. None of these rules were ordained
by God. None sprang from nature. Even in the nineteenth century, when
most of these rules were formulated, they simply represented the value
judgments and policy decisions of common law judges. In part, judges
formulated these rules by considering the same issues of loss distribution
and social welfare that are considered by legislators in enacting modem
regulatory regimes such as tax laws. In establishing the incidents of
property ownership, these rules significantly affect the value of property
rights; in establishing the ground rules for trade and exchanges, they
significantly affect the relative bargaining strength of the parties. Thus
they have decisive and pervasive distributional consequences. If an
individual violates one of these so-called free market rules, another
private party can bring the full coercive power of the state to bear upon
that person by initiating a court action. In all of these respects these rules
are identical to tax laws. Indeed, the very expression "laissez-faire,"
which is often used by those favouring flat taxes in other contexts, is
simply a clever marketing ploy; it is a gross misdescription of any market.
There is simply no possibility of a "neutral," "unregulated" or "free"
market. Note that what I am claiming here is not that historically free
markets have not existed because the government has always insisted on
regulating them, but that the whole notion of an unregulated market is
incoherent; just like tax laws, the rules governing markets are created by
the state, they favour some over others, and they are necessarily coercive.
Thus it reflects a fundamental conceptual confusion to suggest that for
some reason the distributive effects of tax laws should be constrained on
grounds of fairness, but not at the same time insist on flattening the
distributive effects of rules of property and contract law-whatever that
might mean.
At the end of the day, presumably what members of a society care
about is whether the distribution of economic resources in that society is
morally acceptable after the intervention of all government regulatory
regimes, including the regulatory regime commonly referred to as the
rules of the private marketplace. Therefore, why should they attempt to
disable or constrain the distributive consequences of only one govem-
ment instrument, or propose a theory of fairness that would apply to one
regulatory regime, but not to the others?
Having suggested that the notion of a flat tax is misdescribed, has an
intuitive appeal only because its proponents attempt to piggy-back it on
the unrelated ideas of base broadening and tax cuts, and that it is
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conceptually incoherent, let me now turn directly to some of the argu-
ments that its proponents advance.
IV. Refuting the Claims of Flat Taxers
1. A Simpler Tax System
Perhaps the most appealing feature of a flat tax is the claim that it will
simplify the tax system. The idea that the income tax system could be
made easy to understand, convenient to comply with, and straightforward
to apply, has an obvious attraction. So much so that everyone with a tax
design tries to trade on the virtues of simplicity. It is the one issue upon
which even tax lawyers can speak publicly and sound like statespersons
while attempting to achieve special tax breaks for their clients. The need
for simplicity is thus often used as a slogan to obscure a hidden agenda.
In Canada, during the last major tax reform exercise in 1987, when the
rates were reduced from 10 to 3 brackets, one of the government's most
brazen red herrings during the debate was the claim that this would
simplify the tax system.66
In the context of tax law, the concept of complexity is generally taken
to refer compendiously to three different aspects of the tax system:
technical complexity refers to the difficulty of simply understanding the
legislation; structural complexity refers to the difficulty of interpreting
and applying the law with certainty; and, compliance complexity refers
to the variety of record-keeping, form-completing and other tasks that a
taxpayer must perform in order to comply with the law.67 The modem
Canadian income tax system is complex in all three respects.
When first enacted in 1917, the income tax was legislated in under 11
pages; today the consolidated legislation requires more than 1,400 very
66. See N. Brooks, "The Changing Structure of the Canadian Tax System: Accommodating
the Rich" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 137.
67. The literature analyzing problems relating to the simplification of the tax law is legion.
For recent representative articles see R. D. Brown, "Tax Simplification: Simple or Simplistic?"
in Report of the Proceedings of the Fourty-Seventh Tax Conference, 1995 Conference Report
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1996) c. 5; G.S. Cooper, "'A Rose Is a Flower Is a Plant':
Tax Simplification South of the Equator" Report ofthe Proceedings ofthe Fourty-Seventh Tax
Conference, 1995 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1996) c. 3; M.
Gammie, "Tax Simplification: Right Path or Dead End?" Report of the Proceedings of the
Fourty-Seventh Tax Conference, 1995 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Founda-
tion, 1996) c. 2; E.J. McCaffery, "The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification" (1990) Wis. L. Rev.
1267; and D. Schenk, "Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals"
(1989) 45 Tax L. Rev. 121.
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finely printed pages. The drafting is undeniably Byzantine. In some
sections, single sentences roll on for almost a dozen pages as refinements
are grafted on to the exceptions to the provisos. The terms used are
unfamiliar: balance of annuitized voluntary contributions, butterfly trans-
actions, capitalization of soft costs, cumulative offset account, and
countless other concepts used in the Act are not part of everyday
language. A famous American judge once remarked that the words of the
income tax "merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession:
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception--couched
in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of-and] leave in my
mind only a confused sense of something vitally important but success-
fully concealed ...."I' Since the legislation is so fundamental to each
citizen's responsibilities to the state, the idea that everyone should be able
to read and understand the Act seems uncontentious.
The fact that tax law is difficult to apply to some circumstances and
transactions is indisputable. Every spring, Toronto newspapers, and I am
sure newspapers in every other city, invent an income tax situation of
moderate, but not exceptional, complexity and invite some number of
professional tax preparers to calculate the appropriate tax liability. The
newspapers generally receive back a different answer from each profes-
sional that returns the form.69 Another springtime ritual at many newspa-
pers is calling Revenue Canada's toll-free numbers and asking the same
set of questions to several taxpayer service representatives. Again, some
large percentage of questions are invariably answered inconsistently and
incorrectly. As a further indication of the difficulty of applying the tax
rules, every year 50,000 to 55,000 taxpayers file notices of objection to
Revenue Canada's assessment of their tax returns. Following the admin-
istrative appeal procedure, about 4,000 tax disputes are annually ap-
pealed to the Tax Court."
Complying with the tax laws is a costly affair for many taxpayers. In
1995, over 40 percent of Canadian taxfilers paid a professional tax
68. L. Hand, "Thomas Walter Swan" (1947-48) 57 Yale L.J. 167 at 169.
69. See for example D. Flavelle, "Tax preparers give 3 different answers" Toronto Star (28
March 1998) B I (three different tax preparers calculated three different refunds due on the
same typical return submitted to them ranging from $650 to $2,160. The tax preparer's fees
varied about as much as the tax refund they calculated, from a low of $56 to a high of $250).
70. Canada, Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the
House of Commons, vol. 1, April, 1998 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government
Services Canada, 1998) at 5-12.
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preparer to assist them in filing their tax return." Professor Francois
Vaillancourt has estimated that on average individual taxpayers prepar-
ing their own return devoted 5.5 hours to the task in 1985.72 He also.
estimated that the total cost to the government and individual Canadian
taxpayers for administering and complying with the personal income tax
and various payroll taxes was about $5.5 billion in 1986. 73 The promise,
often made by flat taxers, that if tax rates were flat everyone could fill out
their tax returns on the back of a post card, presumably during a
commercial break while viewing The National/CBC News, has an
obvious attraction.
In spite of the apparent urgency of simplifying the tax system, the
proposition that flattening the tax rates will do so is patent nonsense. None
of the difficulties of understanding the Act, the mistakes that profession-
als make in filing returns, the wrong answers that Revenue Canada agents
give in answering taxpayer's questions over the telephone, or the head-
aches involved in filling out a tax return, has to do with applying the tax
rates. The section in the Act that sets out the tax rates is one of the most
straightforward: it is scarcely a dozen lines.74 It has not been the subject
of any court cases or interpretive problems, so far as I am aware. No one
has trouble applying this section. Further, once someone's taxable
income is calculated on their tax return, a grade three student can calculate
the tax owing, no matter how many rates there are. Whether the tax
structure has 2 or 87 rates, once taxable income is determined the
calculation of tax owing requires only 2 lines on the return.
The fact that the rate structure has nothing to do with the complexity
of a particular tax is obvious when one considers that the tax system is full
of taxes with flat rates and yet none are simple. Most notably, the
corporate income tax is basically a flat rate tax system, all corporations
apply the same basic corporate tax rate to their taxable income, and yet
in contrast to it the individual income tax is simplicity itself. While most
law students handily survive the rigours of the individual income tax
course, the majority are traumatized by the complexity of corporate
71. Information obtained from Revenue Canada, Communications. Of the 40 percent of tax
filers who paid someone to fill out the forms, 15 percent (of all tax filers) paid an accountant
or lawyer while about 13.5 percent paid a specialized tax service preparer, such as H&R Block.
Another 10 percent of taxpayers had a friend or relative prepare their tax return for free.
D. Flavelle, "Beware when hiring preparer" Toronto Star (28 March 1998) B5.
72. F. Vaillancourt, The Administrative and Compliance Costs of the Personal Income Tax
and Payroll Tax System in Canada, 1986, Canadian Tax Paper No. 86 (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 1989) 45.
73. Ibid. at 83.
74. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I (5th Supp.), s. 117(2).
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income tax courses. The alternative minimum tax for individuals is a flat
17 percent, yet to calculate it requires the same complexity as the income
tax itself. The federal goods and services tax (GST) is levied at a low flat
rate of 7 percent. Yet the GST is an expensive tax to administer and
imposes large compliance costs on the private sector, particularly small
businesses, estimates range from $1.5 to $4.6 billion.75 Even though the
GST was only enacted in 1991, there are now as many tax guides and
looseleaf services and other advisory services attempting to make sense
of it as there are for the income tax.
One way of illustrating that the rate structure has almost nothing to do
with the complexity of the income tax system is to briefly examine the
elements of the system. The income tax is composed of two distinct
elements: a technical tax system designed for raising revenue and a tax
expenditure system designed for providing government subsidies. The
first element consists, in turn, of six structural components necessary to
implement a revenue-raising tax on income, each has inherently complex
characteristics.
Jurisdictional rules. All income tax systems, regardless of their rate
structure, require a complex set of rules defining what individuals,
corporations, trusts, and other units will be subject to the tax on a personal
basis. They also need an equally complex set of rules defining what
income will be subject to tax within thejurisdiction because the income's
economic nexus with the jurisdiction is sufficiently close that the juris-
diction can justifiably tax it regardless of the personal residence of the
owner. Measures providing for double taxation relief, the allocation of
income and expenses to activities within the jurisdiction, and the preven-
tion of international tax avoidance, constitute some of the most intricate
and detailed rules in any income tax system that takes seriously the
preservation of its tax base and the competitiveness of its industries in an
open and integrated world economy. All of these rules, and many others
that are needed to deal with cross-border and international transactions,
are required regardless of the flatness of the rate structure.
Base of the tax. Whatever the tax rate structure, the base to which it is
to apply has to be clearly specified. On the assumption that the base is to
be 'net income,' precisely defining the base is no easy task. Defining
'gross income,' in order to arrive at net income, presents almost intrac-
table problems. Given the structural design of the Canadian income tax
base, for example, a number of potential sources of gross income have to
75. J.R. Kesselman, General Payroll Taxes: Economics, Politics, and Design, Canadian Tax
Paper No. 101 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1997) 313.
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be distinguished such as income from employment, income from prop-
erty, income from business and capital gains. Not only must each of these
items of gross income be distinguished from one another, but also each
must be distinguished from sources of income that are not taxed such as
nontaxable conditions of employment, windfalls, gifts, gambling win-
nings, and earnings from a hobby. Furthermore, gross income must be
distinguished from a recovery of capital and other transactions that do not
necessarily result in an increase in the taxpayer's net wealth. Once having
determined a taxpayer's gross income, to arrive at his or her net income
further difficult conceptual issues must be resolved such as the distinction
between personal and business expenses and current and capital ex-
penses. The dozens of disputable margins between these various con-
cepts alone account for a good deal of tax complexity; their explication
comprises the great bulk of most basic law school courses in tax law; and,
the great majority of reported tax cases involve sorting them out and
applying them to the infinite variety of personal and commercial transac-
tions. Since they have to do with defining the appropriate tax base to
which to apply the rate of tax, problems associated with distinguishing
between these concepts would arise as frequently under a flat tax as under
a progressive rate tax.
Period of measurement. Income is computed under most tax systems,
and the rates applied, on an annual basis. This means that a series of rules
are needed to allocate items of income and expenditures to particular
periods. Moreover, rules are needed, such as loss carryover rules, to
alleviate the unfairness involved in somewhat arbitrarily requiring indi-
viduals to compute their income on an annual basis. In order to make the
administration of the tax feasible, tax drafters frequently look to financial
accounting and traditional accounting principles for standards to apply in
dealing with period of measurement problems. Nevertheless, the result-
ing rules are often intricate. This is particularly the case since some kinds
of gains, such as capital gains, are only taxed on a realization basis.
Indeed, this feature of the tax system, namely that capital gains are not
taxed as they accrue but only when realized, undoubtedly accounts alone
for more tax complexity than the slope of the rate structure. Since flat
taxes do not eliminate the advantages of tax deferral all these rules would
be necessary in a flat rate tax system.
Units to be taxed and attribution rules. A fourth essential component
of every income tax are rules to define the units to be taxed and rules to
ensure that income is attributed to the appropriate taxpaying unit. In
Canada, the individual is the basic unit of tax and the Act contains a series
of rules to ensure that income is attributed to the individual who earns
income or who otherwise controls its source. Although the tax unit must
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be defined whether the rate is flat or progressive, those who push for
flatter taxes sometimes argue that one possible simplification when the
rates are flatter is that detailed attribution rules would not be necessary:
if everyone's tax rate is the same there is no incentive for income splitting,
that is, for attempting to assign one's income to someone else, such as a
spouse or child, who lives in economic mutuality with the taxpayer but
whose tax rate is lower. One hears a good deal of nonsense about this
point. As mentioned above, for almost 70 percent of the taxpayers under
the present tax system the rates are essentially flat. Moreover, almost
90 percent of taxpayers earn their income from employment and have no
opportunity to assign it to some other individual. The only sources of
income that are subject to manipulation by taxpayers anxious to split their
income for tax purposes with their lower-income spouses and children are
taxpayers who earn business income and income from property. Gener-
ally these tend to be higher-income taxpayers. The general rules and
principles as to who must pay tax on income are intuitively understand-
able and straightforward. The complex attribution or income-splitting
rules are essentially default rules: they only come into effect when high-
income individuals with business or property income are attempting to
avoid the rules. Does it really matter if theAct must contain complex rules
to prevent these individuals from avoiding tax? Moreover, all of the rules
that are at present in the Act in order to prevent income splitting would
have to remain even if the rate were flattened. The reason for this is that
under all flat tax proposals a large exemption (effectively a zero rate
bracket) is provided for low-income individuals. Thus there would still
be substantial opportunities to save tax by income splitting among family
members. Indeed, since under some flat tax proposals the basic amount
exempt from tax is even larger than it is under the present system, for
some families the incentive for income splitting might be even greater
under a flat tax than under the present system.
Rates of tax. The provision of the Act dealing with the rates of tax now
requires about 12 lines. Admittedly, this might be reduced to 8 lines if the
rate structure were reduced to one rate instead of three.
Administrative rules. The Act contains a detailed set of rules dealing
with such administrative matters as who must file a tax return, what
information must be provided to the tax department, assessments, reas-
sessments, the payment of tax, withholding taxes, instalment payments,
the need to keep books and records, civil penalties, investigative powers
and powers of search and seizure, notices of objection, tax evasion, and
so on. All the rules necessary to collect and administer the tax are required
regardless of the rate structure. It is sometimes argued that indirectly a
flatter income tax, and in the extreme a flat tax, may reduce administra-
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tion and compliance costs by enabling greater use of administratively
efficient withholding taxes. For example, if almost everyone faces the
same rate, say 20 percent, then most tax could be remitted at the source
of the income payment, rather than by the recipient. Employers could
withhold 20 percent of everyone's wages, banks could withhold 20 percent
of interest payments, and corporations could withhold 20 percent of
dividends. With comprehensive and accurate withholding most individu-
als would not have to file a return at all since no tax would be owing or
refund due. However, again, this advantage of flat taxes is vastly
overstated. Withholding now works reasonably well for employees who
can estimate their income for the year and could easily be expanded to
other sources of income under the present system. If it was expanded there
might be some over- or under-withholding for particular individuals, but
this would also be the case under a flat rate system. Under the flat rate
system some recipients of interest and dividend income, for example,
would be low-income elderly individuals or others who would fall into
the zero-rate bracket or be individuals who had incurred considerable
expenses earning their income from property. Moreover, the point of
requiring taxpayers to file a return is not just to require them to inform the
tax department of their estimated tax liability but to collect sufficient
information from them so the department can determine whether the
return should be audited.
The point of this overview of the essential elements of the tax system
is to make the point that flattening the tax rates cannot possibly lead to
simplification of the structural provisions of the Act. Almost all of the
detailed technical rules necessary to define the six components of the tax
system, other than the rate structure itself (the jurisdictional rules, the tax
base, the tax accounting rules, the attribution rules, and the rules of
procedure), are unaffected by the rate structure. Legal scholars who work
with the detailed rules of the tax system on an ongoing basis are almost
unanimous on this point. For example, Boris Bittker, one of the pre-
eminent tax scholars in the United States, and author of a comprehensive
multi-volume treatise on American tax law, has stated, "having begun my
teaching career two decades ago with a conviction that most of the
complexities in federal income taxation (especially problems of timing
and income-splitting) were indissolubly linked with progression, I am
now convinced that proportionality would not contribute very much to
simplicity."76 Michael Graetz, Professor of Law at Yale Law School, and
76. C.O. Galvin & B.I. Bittker, The Income Tax: How Progressive Should It Be? (Washing-
ton, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1969) at 33.
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former secretary to the treasurer on tax policy, has likewise asserted that,
"[c]ontrary to many popular beliefs.., multiple tax rates are not now a
source of very much complexity in the federal income tax."77
The income tax must necessarily consist of technical rules defining the
components of the structural tax system. But it also consists of numerous
special preferences-often called tax incentives, tax subsidies or tax
expenditures-that are departures from the normal tax structure and that
are designed to subsidize a particular industry, activity, or class of
persons. These special preferences may take one of several forms, such
as permanent exclusions from income, deductions, deferrals of tax
liabilities, nonrefundable credits against tax, refundable credits against
tax, or special rates. Whatever their form, these departures from the
normative tax structure represent government spending for favoured
activities or groups, effected through the tax system instead of through
direct grants, loans, or other forms of government assistance. Illustrative
tax expenditures include the exemption for one-quarter of capital gains,
deductions for child care and moving expenses, deductions for contribu-
tions to Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs), credits for dona-
tions to charitable organizations, credits for tuition fees, credits for
research and development expenditures, fast write-offs for some corpo-
rate capital expenditures, and the low rate of tax for small businesses and
manufacturing and processing profits. The Department of Finance ac-
counts each year for the cost of over 100 tax expenditures for individuals
and over 50 for corporations.78
Many argue that most of these tax expenditures do not serve legitimate
government objectives, and to the extent that they do, these objectives
could be more appropriately pursued by the use of some other govern-
ment policy instrument such as direct government spending programmes;79
however, no matter what one's view of the merits of tax expenditures
there is no question that they enormously complicate the income tax
system. For the average person they undoubtedly account for almost all
the difficulties involved in filing a tax return. Again, once a taxpayer's
taxable income is determined, applying the tax rates, no matter how many
there are, is not difficult. What is difficult is completing the schedules if
a taxpayer is claiming the exemption for one-quarter of realized capital
gains, the deduction for child care expenses, the deduction for contribu-
77. M.J. Graetz, "Current Flat Tax Proposals" (1995) 67 Tax Notes (May 29) 1256 at 1257.
78. Canada, Department of Finance, Government of Canada: Tax Expenditures (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 1998).
79. The leading text on tax expenditures remains S.S. Surrey & P. R. McDaniel, Tax
Expenditures (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
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tions to an RRSP, the credit for tuition fees, or any one of the dozens of
tax expenditures available to qualifying taxpayers.
Even if the flat tax rate proposal were coupled with a comprehensive
broadening of the tax base, under which these tax expenditures were
removed from the tax system, it is not obvious that life would be
simplified for most taxpayers. The reason for this is that presumably at
least some of these tax expenditure programs, if they were removed from
the tax system, would reappear as direct subsidy programs. As direct
subsidy programs these tax expenditures could be better targeted, more
easily enforced, and the government would be more accountable for them
and have more control over them; however, there is little question that this
substitution of direct expenditures for tax expenditures would complicate
life for beneficiaries of these programmes. Instead of simply claiming
their entitlement to the programs on a schedule to their tax return, and
offsetting the amount of the subsidy against their tax liability, they would
presumably have to fill out a separate form to claim the subsidies and
await a cheque in the mail. Although the tax system gains in simplicity,
overall complexity of government operations would likely increase. The
costs of running administratively separate matching grant subsidies for
child care expenses, research and development expenditures, tuition fees,
charitable donations, and the many other similar programs now delivered
through the tax system would probably be much higher than the incre-
mental cost of running these programs through the tax system.
Also, parenthetically, if these tax expenditures measures were re-
pealed it is not clear that their elimination would translate into revenues
available for tax reductions, as misleadingly assumed in all flat tax
proposals. Not only would some repealed tax expenditures likely be
reenacted as direct subsidy programs, since they serve important govern-
ment objectives, but even if not, government expenditures would inevi-
tably increase. For example, repeal of the tax credit for charitable
deductions would undoubtedly lead to an increase in government outlays
for educational, cultural and other activities now supported by the
voluntary sector; repeal of the current tax exclusion for employer-
provided private health insurance and the tax credit for medical expenses
would lead to political demands for increased coverage of public health
insurance plans. Fundamental reform of the income tax base could not
avoid an examination of broader government policy goals in many of the
social and economic policy areas now served by tax expenditures.
Thus, as even this brief review of the two elements of the tax system
makes clear, the tax system's rate structure has almost nothing do to with
its complexity. The major sources of the complexity, uncertainty, and
compliance costs of the income tax arise because of the need to measure
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taxable income on an annual basis and from the felt political need to use
the tax system to pursue social and economic goals through the enactment
of tax expenditures. Also, to be brutally frank, in spite of the mileage that
flat taxers get out of arguing for a simpler tax system, for most people
filing a tax return is simple. The great bulk of the population who live on
a wage or salary either pay no personal income tax at all, or already pay
tax at a flat rate on their earnings. Moreover, to the extent that claiming
a tax credit for charitable donations, for example, complicates filling out
their tax return it is likely that taxpayers would be even more unhappy if
the credit were eliminated on the grounds that would make life simpler for
them. Further, all the talk about letting people file their return on a post
card looks a little silly these days when an increasing number of taxpayers
file over the telephone or by computer. The irony of attempting to appeal
to people's interest in a simpler tax system to justify flat tax rates is that
very likely when most people express concern about the complexity of
the tax system, what they resent is a tax system that appears so complex
that the rich are able to avoid paying their fair share by taking advantage
of loopholes in the details of the rules.8" That is, they want a simpler tax
system so that the rich pay more, not less, tax. One of the many tired old
jokes that is recycled among tax lawyers is one in which an extortionate
government asks taxpayers to fill out a tax return with just two lines: first
line-how much do you make over $50,000; second line-send it to us.
This is not a particularly funny joke, even as jokes by tax lawyers go, but
it does make the point that the complexity of the tax system has nothing
to do with how much tax is collected and whether the rates are low and
flat or confiscatory.
2. Reduced Tax Evasion
A claim frequently made to justify flat tax rates is that lowering income
tax rates will lead to less tax evasion. This argument is particularly
popular in the business press.81 In the heady days of supply-side econom-
80. Researchers have been unable to find any consistent relationships between perceptions
of tax equity and tax complexity. G.A. Carnes & A.D. Cuccia, "An Analysis of the Effect of
Tax Complexity and its Perceived Justification on Equity Judgments" (1996) 18 J. of Am.
Tax'n Assoc. (No. 2) 40.
81. For example, in a story headlined, "Flattaxes the way to end vicious evasion circle" The
Financial Post (21 August 1993) S3, Diane Francis, one of Canada's leading financial
journalists, reported that Canadian taxes were too high and urged the government to reduce
them in order to "reduce widespread tax evasion.... This same reporter wrote a book entitled,
Underground Nation, in which she blamed the alleged burgeoning of the underground
economy in the early 1990s, and most of Canada's other economic ills, on high tax rates and
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ics it was often suggested that cutting marginal tax rates could be revenue
neutral partly because lower marginal rates would lead to greater report-
ing of income. As an aside, at some level, arguing that taxes should be
reduced to encourage tax compliance is a strange argument. It is a little
like arguing that criminal conduct could be reduced by restricting the
definition of criminal offences. Of course it could, but at the expense of
sacrificing the desired level of social order. It would be interesting to
know if those in favour of flat taxes in order to reduce the incentives to
evade are also in favour of legalizing marijuana and other drugs because
of the difficulties of enforcing their prohibition. The argument has a
particularly peculiar ring to it when it is made by the rich themselves or
their representatives. It seems somewhat analogous to political black-
mail. In effect, they are arguing that their taxes should be reduced since
if they are required to pay the amount the democratic majority deem to be
their fair share they will subvert the political will by engaging in criminal
activity. In any event, even accepting that the argument is made in good
faith, the hypothesis that evasion can be reduced by flattening the tax rate
is without theoretical or empirical support.
What is the theory that would explain why flat taxes would reduce tax
evasion? Those who make the argument presumably reason that as tax
rates are lowered the benefits of evasion are reduced and, therefore,
taxpayers are less likely to cheat. If, for example, the tax rate is reduced
from 50 percent to 30 percent, the benefits of not reporting $100 of earned
income slips from $50 to only $30. Since the benefits of cheating are
reduced when marginal tax rates are lowered, evasion should be reduced
as well.
This simple theory of why people fail to comply with tax laws rests
squarely upon the economic account of the criminal mind first developed
over 30 years ago by Gary S. Becker.82 Generally, this approach suggests
that criminal activity can be understood as just one more illustration of
'economic persons' attempting to maximize their expected income by
rationally evaluating the costs and benefits of any chosen activity. In
deciding whether to evade, taxpayers simply weigh the expected benefits
of cheating (the amount of income saved by not paying taxes) against the
other efforts by government to regulate the market economy. D. Francis, Underground Nation:
The Secret Economy and the Future of Canada (Toronto: Key Porter, 1994). See also
T. Corcoran, "Cut taxes to end cheating. Yes, Minister" The Globe and Mail (27 November
1993) B2 and "How to get round tax evasion" The Economist (28 May 1994) 66 (tax evasion
could be reduced by lowering tax rates).
82. G.S. Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach" (1968) 76J. Pol. Econ.
169.
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potential costs (the probabilities of detection and conviction, and the
penalty). Based upon this rational calculation, and their attitude towards
risk, taxpayers will choose to cheat or not.83
Although it might seem obvious that, if one adopts the economic
explanation for why taxpayers commit tax evasion, increased tax rates are
likely to lead to more evasion, in fact, for a number of reasons, the use of
this model of criminal behaviour to explain tax evasion leads to the
opposite conclusion. Basically, this is because, although higher tax rates
increase the benefits of cheating, they also increase the costs, and the
costs increase faster than the benefits, hence, according to the Becker
analysis tax cheating should be reduced with higher rates.
First, assuming that taxpayers are risk averse, a change in the tax rate
will have competing effects on the taxpayer's decision to evade. One the
one hand, it will have a substitution effect. Since declaring income
becomes more expensive as rates increase (high tax rates leave the
taxpayer with less after-tax income than lower tax rates), the taxpayer will
be tempted to substitute undeclared income for declared income-cheat
more. On the other hand, increased tax rates will also have an opposite
income effect. Increased tax rates will reduce the income of taxpayers,
leaving them less well off. On the assumption that individuals are risk-
averse, and that they become more risk-averse the lower their income
(that is, that individuals dislike risk but dislike it relatively less as their
incomes rise), increased tax rates will make it less likely that taxpayers
would be willing to incur the risks of tax evasion (a higher tax rate reduces
net income, causing individuals to be more risk-averse). In the first
attempt to theoretically model the tax evasion decision using these
economic assumptions about human behaviour, Michael Allingham
and Agnar Sandmo concluded that a theoretical economic analysis
yielded indeterminant results regarding the effect of tax rates on
noncompliance.8 4
Second, the costs of tax evasion increase as marginal tax rates increase
not only because of the income effect of higher rates but also because in
83. The leading text on applying the economic model of criminal behaviour to tax evasion is
F.A. Cowell, Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1990).
84. M.G. Allingham & A. Sandmo, "Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis" (1972)
1 J. Pub. Econ. 323. This basic model has been refined by many subsequent analysts, however,
the elaborations have not supported the theoretical proposition that lower tax rates will lead to
reduced tax evasion. For a review of this research see G.S. Cooper, "Analyzing Corporate Tax
Evasion" (1994) 50 Tax L. Rev. 33 at 51-59. But see G. Yaniv, "Tax Evasion and the Income
Tax Rate: A Theoretical Reexamination" (1994) 49 Pub. Fin. 107.
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most income tax systems, including Canada's, the penalties for evasion
are dependent on the amount of tax evaded not the amount of income
unreported. Thus as the tax rate increases the penalty incurred for not
reporting a fixed amount of income also increases. For example, if a
taxpayer does not report $100 of income when the tax rate is 50 percent,
and the penalty is 150 percent of the amount evaded, the penalty will be
$75; if the rate were only 30 percent the penalty would be only $45. When
this qualification is made to the basic economic model described above,
that is if it is assumed that fines are levied on evaded taxes rather than
evaded income, it has been shown that there would be no substitution
effect, hence, higher tax rates should lead unambiguously to reduced
evasion.8 5
A third cost to the taxpayer that increases as tax rates increase is the
likelihood of an audit. An increase in the tax rates increases the incentives
for the tax department to audit since, for a given level of under-reporting,
the total tax and penalties collected from an audit will be greater. Using
a game theory model, Michael Graetz and his co-authors concluded that
if taxpayers and the tax department both adopt a strategy that is optimal
in light of the other's strategy, then an increase in marginal rates will lead
to increased compliance.86 The increased incentive the tax department
has to audit will dominate the increased potential payoff to the taxpayer
when tax rates are increased. Based upon the above considerations,
theoretical studies in economics have reached the counterintuitive result
that an increase in tax rates should increase compliance: the costs of
noncompliance associated with an increase in tax rates outweigh the
benefits.17 However, just as significant in discrediting the hypothesis that
reduced rates will increase compliance is the fact that the theory of human
behaviour underlying the economic model of crime is too simple. It
reflects the utterly impoverished view of human behaviour that underlies
much of economic theorizing, namely, that in deciding whether to engage
in illegal conduct individuals should be assumed to be perfectly amoral,
totally rational, risk-averse utility-maximizers. Others who study crimi-
nal behaviour, including tax evasion, such as psychologists and sociolo-
gists, note that human behaviour is much more complex than assumed by
85. S. Yitzhaki, "A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis" (1974) 3 J. Pub.
Econ. 201.
86. M.J. Graetz, J.F. Reinganum & L.L. Wilde, "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an
Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement" (1985) 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1.
87. The studies are reviewed in most advanced public finance textbooks. See G.D. Myles,
Public Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) c. 12 and J. Cullis &
P. Jones, Public Finance and Public Choice: Analytical Perspectives (London: McGraw-Hill,
1992) c. 8.
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economic models and that moral, social and political dimensions of tax
evasion are much more significant in predicting criminal behaviour than
economic considerations. Psychologists assume individuals are moral
beings with ideas and values of their own and that commands and
impulses filter through and are affected by this moral screen. Thus, they
have noted that at the very least even economic factors that might
influence criminal behaviour, such as the benefits of crime, the size of
penalties and the probability of detection, are mediated through indi-
vidual attitudes and perceptions. Moreover, they have shown that most
decisions, including decisions about tax evasion, are not usually gov-
erned by maximizing strategies but by rules of thumbs or heuristics or by
how individuals frame their decisions. Sociologists tend to see the causes
of variation in human behaviour in the structure of the social system.
Hence they tend to explain people's actions by examining the forces that
impinge on the positions they occupy within the system. Among other
things, this means that they extend the basic economic model of crime
control by making the point that law is not the only source of punishments
and rewards. Taxpayers live and work in society. They have families,
friends, and co-workers who are sources of rewards and punishments.
These social forces shape behaviourjust as effectively as the rewards and
punishments administered by the state. Moreover, in deciding whether to
comply with the tax law individuals are influenced by their attitudes
toward government, views relating to the enforcement of tax laws, views
about the fairness of the tax system, contact with Revenue Canada and
demographic characteristics. The point is that any realistic account of
why people evade taxes would place little weight on tax rate changes.
Whatever weight tax rates have in the decision of most individuals to
evade tax is likely dwarfed by other more significant moral, social and
political considerations. Indeed, to the extent that most individuals would
regard flat rates as inequitable, such a change might result in more
evasion. 8
8
88. Studies on the determinants of tax evasion behaviour are legion. The leading collections
of articles include J.A. Roth, J.T. Scholz & A.D. Witte, eds., Taxpayer Compliance: AnAgenda
for Research, vol. I (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989); J.A. Roth & J.T.
Scholz, eds., Taxpayer Compliance: Social Science Perspectives, vol. 2 (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989); and, J. Slemrod, ed., Why People Pay Taxes: Tax
Compliance and Enforcement (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992). A sampling
of the recent work of some of the leading researchers may be found in J. Aim, I. Sanchez &
A. De Juan, "Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance" (1995) 48 Kyklos 3;
A.D. Cuccia, "The Economics of Tax Compliance: What Do We Know and Where Do We
Go?" (1994) 13 J. Acct. Lit. 81; J.S. Carroll, "Taxation: Compliance with Federal Personal
Income Tax Laws" in D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer, eds., Handbook of Psychology and Law
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Theories of human behaviour suggest that at best tax rates are likely to
have a minor effect on compliance. Certainly, it is difficult to postulate
a serious theory that would suggest that reducing tax rates would increase
compliance. In light of this strong presumption suggested by theory, what
does the evidence suggest? Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on the
issue is limited and somewhat unreliable. The leading study tending to
show that marginal tax rates and noncompliance are directly related
remains a study published in 1983, using data from 1969, by an American
economist, Charles Clotfelter. Holding a number of taxpayer character-
istics constant, he found that those who faced higher marginal income tax
rates understated their adjusted gross income by larger amounts than
taxpayers who faced lower rates. Thus, he concluded that tax rates should
be considered to be "valid instruments for influencing tax evasion."89
Clotfelter's data sources and methodology have been extensively
criticized. 9° Most significantly, since his study was a cross-section across
income levels, and since marginal tax rates are mostly determined by
income level, his results can be interpreted as simply showing that high-
income taxpayers are less compliant than low-income taxpayers. In a
subsequent study, Dennis Cox, of the United States Internal Revenue
Service, attempted to control for this possible association by undertaking
a cross-section study across individuals with the same income but
resident in different states.9' Since individual states have quite different
rates of income tax, if marginal tax rates affected compliance then high-
income taxpayers in states with high marginal tax rates might have been
expected to have lower compliance levels than taxpayers in the same
income class but in low marginal tax rate states. Using basically the same
data source as Clotfelter, but using data from 1979 and controlling for
income, Cox was unable to find any evidence that higher income tax rates
increase the rate of tax evasion: "I conclude from all of this that the
(New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992) c.25; J.G. Cullis & A. Lewis, "Why People Pay Taxes:
From a Conventional Economic Model to a Model of Social Convention" (1997) 18 J. Econ.
Psychol. 305; P.A. Hite, "An Investigation of Moral Suasion and Vertical Equity Arguments
on Intended Taxpayer Noncompliance" (1997) 19 Law & Pol'y 1; and V. Tanzi & P. Shome,
"A Primer on Tax Evasion"(1993) 40 IMF Staff Papers 807.
89. C.T. Clotfelter, "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns" (1983)
65 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 363 at 373..He did, however, qualify this conclusion by noting that,
"[w]hether... [the compliance effect of reduced rates] should become an explicit consideration
in formulating future tax policy depends, of course, on its magnitude, and the estimates in this
paper suggest that it probably is not large compared to other objectives." Ibid. at 372-73.
90. See J.A. Dubin, M.J. Graetz, & L.L. Wilde, "Are We a Nation of Tax Cheaters? New
Econometric Evidence on Tax Compliance" (1987) 77 Am. Econ. Rev. (No. 2) 240 and D. Cox,
"Raising Revenue in the Underground Economy" (1984) 37 Nat'l Tax J. 283.
91. Cox, ibid.
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compliance data we have do not reveal a relationship between tax rates
and compliance that can be exploited in design of our income tax
system. ' 92 Other empirical studies have similarly reached mixed or
inconclusive results in searching for a relationship between marginal tax
rates and compliance.9 3
The important lesson to be drawn from the cumulative evidence of
social science research on tax evasion is that neither serious theoretical
analysis nor systematic empirical research has been able to find any
relationship between tax rates and tax evasion. Casual observation and
common sense would appear to support this conclusion. There is no
significant correlation between tax levels and evasion activity in coun-
tries around the world.94 For example, Italy, which has one of the largest
underground economies has a tax level that is only slightly above the
average European country; Spain, which has the second highest level of
evasion has below average tax levels. By contrast, Austria, which has one
of the smallest underground economies has above average tax levels. Flat
taxers often hold up the 15 percent flat tax system of Hong Kong as a
system to be emulated, yet the underground economy in Hong Kong is
notoriously large. It is the case that tax levels and evasion have both
92. Ibid. at 288.
93. Econometric studies that suggest there might be a positive relationship between tax rates
and tax evasion include a series of articles by S.E. Crane & F. Nourzad, "Inflation and Tax
Evasion: An Empirical Analysis" (1986) 68 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 217; "On the Treatment of
Income Tax Rates in Empirical Analysis of Tax Evasion" (1987) 40 Kyklos 338; "Tax Rates
and Tax Evasion: Evidence from California Amnesty Data" (1990) 43 Nat'l Tax J. 189;
"Analysing Income Tax Evasion Using Amnesty Data with Self-Selection Correction: The
Case of the Michigan Tax Amnesty Program" in J. Slemrod, ed., Why People Pay Taxes: Tax
Compliance and Enforcement (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992) 167. For
studies that suggest that marginal rates have no significant effect on evasion see J. Slemrod,
"An Empirical Test for Tax Evasion" (1985) 67 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 232; H. Geeroms &
H. Wilmots, "An Empirical Model of Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance" (1985) 40 Pub. Fin.
190; and Dubin, Graetz, & Wilde, supra, note 90. Experimental studies have also reached
contrasting results, compare N. Friedland, S. Maital & A. Rutenberg, "A Simulation Study of
Income Tax Evasion" (1978) 10 J. Pub. Econ. 107 (finding that in a tax evasion game, evasion
increased with the tax rate) with W. Becker, H.-J. Buchner & S. Sleeking, "The Impact of
Public Transfer Expenditures on Tax Evasion" (1987) 34 J. Pub. Econ. 243 (the propensity to
evade was negatively correlated with the perceived level of tax). See generally M.J. Graetz &
L.L. Wilde, "The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy" (1985) 38 Nat'l Tax.
J. 355 at 362 ("The myopic notion that compliance problems would disappear... if we would
lower tax rates . . . does not withstand even this introductory analysis. Improving tax
compliance will almost certainly require further legislative and administrative actions specifi-
cally directed toward that end.").
94. Estimates of the size of the underground economy in various OECD countries can be
found in F. Schneider, "Further Empirical Results of the Size of the Shadow Economy of 17
OECD Countries Over Time" Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Linz,
March 3, 1998. Taxes levels can be found in OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-1996 (Paris:
OECD, 1997) at 75.
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increased in industrialized countries over the past 30 years, suggesting a
correlation. But there are many other equally plausible explanations for
the increase in the size of the underground economy such as shift to
services and self-employment, forces of globalization, and increasing
levels of unemployment.
Even within the Canadian tax system itself, there is no evidence that
those taxes with the lowest or flattest rates tend to have the least amount
of evasion. What evidence is available suggests the opposite. The GST is
a flat 7 percent tax, yet there was a substantial increase in the underground
economy in the early 1990s and at least some researchers have attributed
it almost exclusively to the introduction of the GST.95 Capital gains and
dividend income receive preferential treatment within the income tax
system. They are subject to a tax rate that is about one-third less than the
tax rate applicable to labour income. Yet, although again there is no clear
evidence, anecdotal evidence would suggest there is likely much more
evasion with respect to these types of income than there is with respect
to labour income. In the United States, for example, at a time when
ordinary income was taxed at a 50 percent rate and capital gains at only
a 20 percent rate, only 40 percent of capital gains were reported.96 Of
course there is no withholding or information return required for capital
gains as there is for ordinary income. Yet this makes the point that if there
is an opportunity for under-reporting income people will understate such
income even if the unreported income would be taxed at a low rate.
Finally, contrary to the prediction that would be made by those who argue
that if the tax rates were flattened there would be less evasion under the
present system, individuals in low rate brackets appear as likely to cheat
as those in higher brackets. Again, there is little reliable evidence of how
compliance is affected by income level, but a 1993 survey of individuals
in the province of Quebec revealed that low-income individuals were
more likely than high-income individuals to engage in unreported work. 97
Finally, if those who push for flat taxes were truly concerned about tax
evasion there would be countless obvious steps they could promote to
95. P.S. Spiro, "Evidence of a Post-GST Increase in the Underground Economy" (1993) 41
Can. T. J. 247 and "The Underground Economy: Toward a More Balanced View of Alternative
Methodologies" (1994) 2 Can. Bus. Econ. (no 4) 18. For explanations in addition to the
introduction of the GST see R. Mirus, R.S. Smith & V. Karoleff, "Canada's Underground
Economy Revisited: Update and Critique" (1994) 20 Can. Pub. Pol'y 235 at 236-238 and
D. Drummond etal., "The Underground Economy: Moving the Myth Closer to Reality" (1994)
2 Can. Bus. Econ. (No. 4) 3 at 7.
96. Graetz & Wilde, supra note 93 at 360.
97. Survey results reported in Quebec, Commission on Taxation and the Financing of Public
Services: Making Choices Together, "The Underground Economy, Unreported Work and Tax
Evasion" (Quebec: Les Publications du Quebec, 1996) at 7-9.
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prevent tax evasion that would be much more effective than tax reduc-
tions; for example, comprehensive withholding requirements for prop-
erty and business income; requiring withholding on most payments made
by businesses to service contractors; the expansion of financial transac-
tion reports and the right and ability to match these and other information
returns relating to assets with tax return information; requiring insurance
and other companies to report amounts paid to auto repair shops and so
on; requiring taxpayers with assets over a certain amount to file balance
sheets with their tax returns; increasing the climate for taxpaying by
reminding taxpayers of the connection between the taxes they pay and the
safe streets, liveable cities, hospitals, schools, and roads they all enjoy;
providing penalties for taxpayers who do not disclose questionable
positions on their returns; throwing more tax evaders injail; requiring the
public disclosure of corporate tax returns filed by corporations over a
certain size; and increasing the number of tax audits.
3. Increased Economic Prosperity
a. The False Promises of Supply-Side Economists
Every ill the economy has suffered over the past two decades has been
attributed by neoconservatives to high tax rates on rich individuals; the
most persistent refrain has been that the present progressive tax system
has stagnated the economy and productivity growth. Flattening tax rates
would usher in a new era of unconstrained prosperity, they plead.
How might reduced tax rates for rich individuals increase the standard
of living of everyone? The precise behavioural mechanisms through
which lower tax rates are supposed to unleash unbridled economic
growth are sometimes difficult to discern from the musings of flat taxers,
however, faced with lower marginal tax rates, it appears to be assumed
that (i) the rich will work more hours per week, more weeks per year, and
more years per lifetime since the amount they can earn after tax from
working will have increased; (ii) they will save more because the
government will be taking less of the interest, dividends and capital gains
they can earn on their savings; and (iii) rich and talented Canadians will
be more likely to remain in Canada and contribute to the economy instead
of emigrating to more tax-hospitable countries. The flat taxers make other
claims, such as if tax rates are low, more individuals will be encouraged
to become entrepreneurs or otherwise make risky investments since they
will be allowed to keep more of the resulting profits, and high individual
tax rates serve as a signal to international business that the jurisdiction
imposing them is unfriendly to business and therefore discourages
businesses from locating in the jurisdiction. However, the three enumer-
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ated claims are the ones most central to their case and are the ones I will
deal with here.
Flat taxers frequently buttress their economic case for lower tax rates
with a litany of standard rhetorical flourishes. Alluding to one of Aesop's
Fables, they sometimes refer to progressive taxes as killing the goose that
lays the golden egg. An analogy to a leaky bucket is another favourite. 98
If a bucket of full of water represents the amount of national income that
those who support progressive taxes want to transfer from high-income
individuals to low-income individuals, flat taxers make the point that the
higher the tax rates the leakier the bucket. Leaks are also caused by
administrative expenses, changes to the motivation of recipients, and
other factors involved in taxes and transfers that cause reduced work
effort. At some point, because there is so much leakage, the attempted
redistribution is not worth the effort. The parable that equates national
income to a pie is a further favourite. Flat taxers claim that those who
support progressive taxes are obsessed with how to slice the pie, and with
ensuring that the special interest groups that they represent-like poor
children, the impoverished elderly, the sick, students and all other
powerful interest groups-get a decent-sized slice of the pie. However,
concentrating on slicing the pie into smaller and smaller wedges, results
in no growth in the size of the pie. Flat-taxers, by contrast, say they are
concerned about the size of the pie. If public policies, such as flat taxes,
are enacted, it will enlarge the size of the pie and there will be bigger slices
for everyone. In these terms, the critical questions are how much more
leaky do higher taxes make the tax/transfer-bucket, or how much larger
will the economic pie become if tax rates on high-income individuals are
reduced?
The economic arguments that flat taxers make are derived from the
familiar, and much maligned, "trickle-down" theory of economics: a tax
cut will cause rich people to work harder, save and invest more and thus
make everyone better off in the long run. This argument was popularized
by the so-called "supply-siders" and had its heyday during the Reagan
administration in the United States.99 Briefly, according to traditional
Keynesian doctrine, employment and economic growth are determined
98. This analogy was developed at length by Arthur Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big
Tradeoff (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975).
99. Writing books on supply-side economics became a cottage industry among many of the
entrepreneurs who made up the school. The leading texts were B. Bartlett & T.P. Roth, eds.,
The Supply-Side Solution (London: Macmillan, 1983); G. Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New
York: Basic Books, 1981); P.C. Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1984); and, J. Wanniski, The Way the World Works, rev. ed. (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1983).
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by aggregate demand. Unemployment and low rates of economic growth
are caused by insufficient spending. Thus conventional Keynesian eco-
nomics requires government to manage aggregate demand by using fiscal
policy to influence the spending of consumers, businesses, and govern-
ments. During the late 1970s, when many western economies were
suffering from stagflation-high rates of unemployment and inflation-
supply-side economists stepped in and argued that the preoccupation of
Keynesians with demand had blinded them to the need for analysing the
effect of changing tax rates on productivity, investment and incentives to
work. They argued that instead of concentrating on demand, govern-
ments should concentrate on increasing the supply of goods and services.
Although supply-side economics addresses all aspects of aggregate
supply, it focuses in particular on the appropriate role of government in
encouraging growth through its taxation policies.
There are many versions of supply-side economics; even the most
modest version should be discounted. However, it is worth noting that
almost no one believes the version that flat taxers often put forward,
namely, that by reducing tax rates, tax revenues would significantly
increase as individuals work harder, save more and take more risks. John
Kenneth Galbraith called it "a relatively sophisticated form of fraud."
Walter H. Heller likened it to laetrile, and James Tobin, Nobel Laureate
in economics, temed it "snake oil." During the campaign for the
Republican nomination in 1980, when Ronald Reagan popularised this
variant of supply-side theory, George Bush referred to it as "voodoo
economics." When Bush ran for president in 1988, he espoused much the
same economic theory. A columnist renamed it "deep voodoo" and said
it sounded like "deja voodoo all over again." Another protested that the
economic theory was "giving voodoo a bad name." '
No one doubts the existence of the kind of incentive effects flat taxers
postulate. Incentive effects of this kind are the stuff of Econ 101, as
economists are fond of endlessly reminding us. The question is how
important the incentive effects are within a range of reasonable tax rates,
and what they add up to in relation to the potential GDP. Although it
seems to be almost an article of faith among the converted that high taxes
have significant adverse effects on economic growth, this proposition is
not obvious in theory, nor is it supported by the weight of empirical
evidence.
100. These and other epithets used by leading economists and journalists in referring to the
theory are cited in M. Gardner, Knotted Doughnuts and Other Mathematical Entertainments
(New York: W.H. Freeman, 1986) c. 21 at 264.
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b. Historical Evidence: High Marginal Tax Rates Have Coexisted
with High Growth
One obvious way to determine whether or not high marginal tax rates
affect economic growth is simply to attempt to observe whether there is
any relationship between these two phenomena or variables. This might
be done by examining changes in tax rates and rates of economic growth
over some period of time in one country (if marginal tax rates affect
economic growth, then one might expect that when marginal tax rates
decline rates of growth would increase) or by comparing tax rates and
rates of economic growth across a number of countries (if marginal tax
rates affect economic growth, then one might expect that those countries
with high marginal tax rates would be floundering while those with low
marginal tax rates would be flourishing).
Looking first at changes in marginal tax rates in Canada over the past
fifty years, the fact that reductions in the top marginal tax rate have been
accompanied by reduced rates of economic growth must at least be a
troubling coincidence to those who argue that reducing the top marginal
tax rate is the key to spurring economic growth. In the late 1940s and early
1950s, the top marginal tax rate was in excess of 90 percent and in real
terms the gross domestic product was increasing at an annual rate of
6.2 percent; in the 1950s and 1960s the top marginal tax rate was in excess
of 80 percent and the average annual growth rate was 5.1 percent; from
1972 to 1981 the top marginal tax rate was reduced to about 60 percent
and the growth rate slipped to 4.2 percent; since 1981 the top marginal tax
rate has been around 50 percent and the growth rate has averaged only
2.4 percent.10 1 This time-series correlation between marginal tax rates
and growth rates points unambiguously to a negative, not a positive
relationship.
Similar experiences have been observed in other countries. In Japan,
throughout the whole of the so-called Japanese miracle, when economic
growth in Japan was the envy of the world, its top marginal tax rate was
over 80 percent. No one has ever accused Japanese executives or workers
of taking too much leisure. It was reduced in recent years and Japan has
slipped into a recession. Sweden had a very high rate of economic growth
throughout the 1960s and 70s and most of the 80s, and its top marginal
tax rate was 75 percent and higher. In a major tax reform exercise in 1991,
101. It is the case that since the 1940s total taxes (and the size of government generally) as
a percent of Gross Domestic Product have risen at the same time that economic growth has
slowed. Supply-siders sometimes point to these coincident trends as evidence that higher taxes
have stunted economic growth. However, it is the marginal tax rate that flat-taxers claim has
the most serious effect on productive behaviour.
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the Swedish top rate of tax on labour income was reduced to 50 percent
and the tax on investment income was set at a flat 30 percent. In the same
year, Sweden slipped into its most severe economic downturn since the
1930s. Between 1991 and 1993 its economy shrank by more than
5 percent.'0 2 In fact, in the late 1980s practically all industrialized
countries reduced their marginal tax rates in response to the reduction in
marginal rates in the United States in 1986, with disappointing results.
The one historical example that flat taxers frequently refer to as
proving the favourable effect of flatter tax rates on economic growth is the
tax cuts in the United States in the early 1980S.113 In 1981, President
Reagan reduced the marginal tax rate on investment income from
70 percent to 50 percent and introduced tax cuts that generally lowered
the average rates of tax. From 1983 to 1989, the United States experi-
enced a prolonged period of economic growth. The supply-siders at-
tribute this to the tax cuts. However, it is unlikely that the tax cuts were
responsible for any of this economic growth.
Since the reduced tax rate on labour income was not substantial, the
principal argument the supply-siders made in support of the Reagan tax
cuts was that they would result in increased economic growth by inducing
high-income individuals to save and invest more. Yet, unfortunately for
their theory, the United States private savings rate fell in the 1980s, after
being constant for decades. The personal saving rate slid from 5.9 percent
in 1981 to 2.5 percent in 1987. The net national saving rate dropped even
more, from 6.4 in 1981 to 1.7 in 1987, reflecting the large deficit created
in part by the reduced tax rates. There are a number of plausible
explanations for the drop in the savings rates over this period that
confound any simple comparison between tax and savings rates; how-
ever, as Barry Bosworth and Gary Burtless note, "the decade offered a
very powerful test of the hypothesis that saving is sensitive to the after-
102. See J. Agell, P. Englund & J. Sodersten, "Tax Reform of the Century - The Swedish
Experiment" (1996) 49 Nat'l Tax J. 641.
103. Some flat taxers also refer to the President Kennedy tax cuts of 1964 as demonstrating
the potent effects of tax cuts. However, while the supply-siders argue that the economic boom
in the late 1960s that followed the tax cuts resulted from the incentive effects of the cut in
marginal tax rates, most economists attribute the impact of the tax cuts to their effect on
aggregate demand. They view the tax cut as a successful experiment with expansionary fiscal
policy and as a confirmation of Keynesian economics. For an analysis of the 1964 tax cut by
one of Kennedy's prominent advisors see A.M. Okun, "Measuring the Impact of the 1964 Tax
Reduction" in W.W. Heller, ed., Perspectives on Economic Growth (New York: Random
House, 1968) 25. Moreover, the extent to which the economic growth that followed the tax cuts
would have occurred even without the cuts is unclear since GDP growth averaged over five
percent even in the two years prior to 1964. See E. Engen & J. Skinner, "Taxation and Economic
Growth" (1996) 49 Nat'l Tax J. 617 at 624.
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tax rate of return. Without some convincing new evidence, government
policy-makers should act under the presumption that income tax incen-
tives for saving are likely to fail."' 4 But more to the point here, whatever
the mechanism that lower rates were to operate to produce economic
growth, it clearly was not through their effect on savings rates.
The more likely explanation for the record of economic growth in the
United States during the mid and late 1980s is simply that the economy
was recovering from a deep recession in the early 1980s. Instead of
operating on the supply-side, the tax cuts, along with expanding defence
expenditures, fuelled an increase in aggregate demand that simply
increased the utilization of excess capacity without raising the potential
output of the economy.0 5 As Paul Krugman observes, if economic
growth between the peaks of the business cycle are compared, from 1979
to 1990, the US economy grew at an annual rate of 2.3 percent, which was
lower than the growth rates over the business cycle even in the 1970s.10 6
There is simply no evidence that the tax cuts did anything to increase the
underlying productive capacity of the U.S. economy. In fact, throughout
the 1980s, labour productivity, or output per hour worked, was lower in
the United States than any other major industrialized country. 10 7 While
tax cuts make rich people richer, they apparently do not make them any
smarter.
In extolling the benefits of the Reagan tax cuts, supply-siders fre-
quently claim that household income increased substantially during this
period. Economic growth in the United States during the 1980s did
translate into increased family incomes, but not nearly as much as might
be predicted since productivity growth was so low. Nevertheless, over the
business cycle, from 1979 to 1990, the income of the average family did
grow by 11 percent. However, quite remarkably, over 70 percent of this
rise in average family income went to the top 1 percent of Americans. The
income of the typical family (that is, the median family) grew by only
4.2 percent over this period.1 8
Finally, although the United States did experience a period of eco-
nomic growth during the 1980s, as it recovered from the deep recession
104. B. Bosworth & G. Burtless, "Effects of Tax Reform on Labor Supply, Investment, and
Saving" (1992) 6 J. Econ. Persp. 3 at 23.
105. See C.B. Garrison, "The Defect in Supply-Side Interpretations of the 1960s and 1980s"
(1991) 25 J. Econ. Issues 153.
106. P. Krugman, Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of
Diminished Prosperity (New York: Norton, 1994) at 117.
107. OECD, Economic Outlook, no. 48 (Paris: OECD, 1990) at 120. (From 1979 to 1988 the
average annual percentage change in labour productivity in the United States was 0.8 percent.
Of the G-7 countries, the next lowest rate was for Canada, at 1.4 percent.).
108. Krugman, supra note 106 at 136-138.
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of 1982, it was not particularly notable. It did not come close to the rate
of growth over the business cycle during the economic upturn in the
1960s and did not even match the growth of the oil-shock decade in the
1970s. Moreover, for every year from 1983 to 1989 the rate of real
economic growth was greater in the province of Ontario than it was in the
United States. In at least three of those years economic growth was almost
2 percentage points greater in tax-weary Ontario than tax-free United
States. 10 Throughout this period, taxes were increasing in the province of
Ontario, not decreasing.
Of course, these simple time-series correlations are subject to all sorts
of confounding variables, and, in spite of the correlation between high
marginal rates and high rates of economic growth in recent history in
Canada, no one would suggest this correlation implies causation, in other
words, that high marginal tax rates on the rich cause economic growth.
For that reason, no one takes these one-time coincidences of economic
history too seriously. However, they are part of the historical record and
at the very least suggest that high tax rates do not appear to have the
adverse effects often attributed to them and that they can coexist with high
rates of economic growth.
Economists have attempted to use time-series analysis to uncover the
effects of taxation on economic growth by using sophisticated economet-
ric methods to control for factors independent of taxes that may affect
economic growth and thus isolate the effect of taxes. As might be
expected, some of these studies have found that taxes have a negative and
statistically significant effect on growth and others have found just the
opposite. "0 A problem with all of these studies is attempting to untangle
the short-term effect of tax changes on growth in the economy, which
might simply reflect the effect of tax cuts associated with deficit spend-
ing, and the long-term effects, which might be due to growth in the
economy's underlying productive capacity.
c. International Evidence: High Taxes Correlate with Productivity
Growth
Time-series studies have many obvious limitations, therefore, analysts
have more frequently turned to cross-section studies for evidence of how
taxes might affect economic growth. During the past few decades, taxes
109. Ontario, Minister of Finance, 1995 Fiscal and Economic Statement, November, 1995
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1995) at Table 19, Data Appendix.
110. A number of studies are summarized in P.N. Ireland, "Two Perspectives on Growth and
Taxes" (1994) 80 Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond, Econ. Q. 1.
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have increased quite dramatically in some countries, while in others they
have remained relatively low. If taxes have an effect on economic growth,
it should be reflected in different rates of growth across these countries.
In recent years, in part because of the increased availability of cross-
country data and the development of endogenous growth theory, which
suggests that governments matter for economic growth, there has been an
explosion of such cross-country studies. "
There are countless problems with, and limitations of, these kinds of
cross-country studies, which are acknowledged by almost all research-
ers. " 2 First, there are problems with selecting and providing an opera-
tional definition for the independent variable. In terms of the present
paper, the most relevant independent variable would be marginal tax
rates. However, marginal tax rates are difficult to measure appropriately
on a comparative basis, therefore, often the studies use a measure of
average effective tax rates, or the ratio of total taxes to gross domestic
product (GDP), as a proxy. Problems abound even attempting to measure
taxes on a comparative basis. What is classified as a tax in one country
might be fashioned as a government price in another; some countries
include amounts paid by governments themselves as part of the tax
burden (for example, sales taxes on purchases), others do not. Instead of
taxes, other studies use some measure of government size as an indepen-
dent variable, for example, total government expenditures, total transfer
spending, social security transfers (cash benefits), or social protection
expenditures (cash benefits, benefits in kind, and expenditures on public
health services). Here again arbitrary budgetary accounting conventions
for taxes and spending can result in economically equivalent programs
appearing to represent different levels of government involvement in
different countries. Also, tax and spending ratios only measure the use of
one governing policy instrument; increasingly governments are substi-
tuting the use of other policy instruments for taxes and transfers to
achieve their social and economic objectives. Finally, all of these tax and
Ill. Many of these studies not only examine the effect of taxes on economic growth, but also
more generally use cross-country data to investigate the determinants of the long-term
economic growth. One of the first studies was R.J. Barro, "Economic Growth in a Cross Section
of Countries" (1991) 106 Q.J. Econ. 407. See more recently R.J. Barro, Determinants of
Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). An
extensive bibliography can be found in R.J. Barro & X. Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1995).
112. See A.B. Atkinson, "The Welfare State and Economic Performance" (1995) 48 Nat'l
Tax J. 171 at 196; Engen & Skinner, supra note 103 at 636; J. Slemrod, "What Do Cross-
Country Studies Teach about Government Involvement, Prosperity, and Economic Growth?"
(1995) 2 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 373.
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spending ratios, as measures of government intervention, completely
mask the details and design of the underlying spending programmes and
tax systems, even though these details and design features can vary
enormously and have significantly different impacts.
A second problem with cross-country studies designed to determine
the effect of taxes is that the appropriate measure of the dependent
variable, economic growth and prosperity, is not obvious. Should it be
simply increases in GDP, real GDP per capita, GDP per employed person,
some measure of labour productivity, or some other measure? Moreover,
to the extent that all these measures are dependent on GDP as an indicator
of a country's economic development and prosperity, they are subject to
the well-known critiques of GDP as an economic indicator, including
criticisms that GDP excludes the value of leisure, non-market activity and
capital services, and includes instrumental expenditures that are not a
direct source of economic well-being such as the regrettable necessities
of police and defence expenditures and the costs of disamenities such as
environmental degradation.
A third problem with these studies is that they tend to be sensitive to
the time periods used and the countries chosen to compare. With time
periods, it is obviously important that the times chosen over which to
make the comparisons do not overlap different stages of the business
cycle across countries. A particularly strikingly illustration of the differ-
ence that the inclusion of one country can make was an analysis done by
the newly elected Conservative Government in Ontario to justify its
30 percent income tax rate reductions. In a chart purporting to demon-
strate that tax reductions are associated with faster economic growth, for
selected OECD countries the government plotted average government
revenues as a percent of GDP from 1960 to 1990 against average per
capita real GDP percent growth for the same period. " 3 The trend line in
the chart suggested that the lower the level of taxes the higher the rate of
per capital GDP growth. Japan was a clear outlier on the chart. Over that
period, it had low rates of taxes and very high rates of growth. If Japan was
removed from the analysis, the trend line actually reversed, suggesting
just the opposite of what the government wanted to show. 114
113. Supra note 109 at 88.
114. Because of Japan's somewhat unique economy, in which, for example, the elements of
economic security that are provided by government programmes in other countries are often
provided by large corporate employers, its inclusion or exclusion can often have a dispropor-
tionate effect in these kinds of analysis and therefore it is often excluded. See P. Saunders,
"What Can We Learn from International Comparisons of Public Sector Size and Economic
Performance" (1986) 2 Eur. Soc. Rev. 52.
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Finally, as with all correlational studies, it is difficult to ensure that all
factors that might affect the dependent variable, economic prosperity,
have been taken into account, and it is difficult to judge the direction of
causality. Even if countries with high taxes have also had high rates of
economic growth, it might be that some third variable, like industrializa-
tion, leads both to higher economic growth and the need for greater
government spending, or that rich countries can simply afford to tax more
and provide a more generous social security system.
Nevertheless, in spite of the common belief among economists that
large governments have a substantially negative impact on prosperity, so
far, this empirical program, for all its shortcomings, suggests that the
economic costs of high taxes and large governments are insignificant.
Individual studies sometimes purport to show that higher taxes lead to
lower growth, however, when the cumulative research program is exam-
ined it is clear that the weight of the evidence suggests that taxes do not
have much effect on economic growth. Instead of reviewing the indi-
vidual studies here I will simply refer to recent summaries.
Anthony Atkinson, one of England's most distinguished public fi-
nance scholars, recently reviewed a number of aggregate empirical
studies that attempted to determine whether there was any relationship
between the size of government, in particular the amount spent on social
transfers, and some measure of economic performance. Of the nine
studies he reviewed, two found that government spending had an insig-
nificant effect on annual growth rates, two found a negative relationship
(increased transfers reduced economic growth), and three found a posi-
tive relationship. He concludes his review by noting that "the results of
econometric studies are mixed, and provide no overwhelming evidence
that high spending on social transfers leads to lower growth rates."" 5 In
one of the most thorough reviews of the studies examining the relation-
ship between aspects of a country's tax system and prosperity, Joel
Slemrod concludes, "[t]his review of the existing cross-country literature
suggests that there is no persuasive evidence that the extent of govern-
ment has either a positive or a negative impact on either the level or the
growth rate of per capita income... 1116 In another review, Peter Ireland
115. Atkinson, supra note 112 at 196. Another survey of studies is undertaken by Esping-
Andersen, this time of those using a broader definition of welfare state effort - total levels of
social spending as a share of GDP. Again, the studies reveal a mix of positive, negative and
insignificant effects on national output. G. Esping-Andersen, "Welfare States and the Economy"
in N.J. Smelser & R. Swedberg, eds., The Handbook of Economic Sociology (New York:
Princeton University Press, 1994) 711.
116. Slemrod, supra note 112 at 401.
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concludes, "a review of the literature reveals that no strong conclusions
can yet be reached .... A number of papers present evidence that tax rates
do affect long-run growth, but others find no significant relationship."' 17
Eric Engen and Jonathan Skinner conclude their review of the evidence
with the observation that, "the design of the tax system is likely to exert
a modest, but cumulatively important, influence on long-term growth
rates.""18 In a thorough review of the impact of fiscal policy variables on
output growth for the International Monetary Fund, Phillip Gerson
concludes:
[o]verall, the evidence of these cross-section studies of the effects of tax
rates on per capita income growth appears to be contradictory ....
[E]ven if the cross-section studies on the effects of taxes on growth yielded
a consensus opinion, it would be wise to treat their results with some
caution. In the absence of a consensus, it certainly pays to draw on the
results of the substantial body of empirical work that indicates that labour
supply decisions -at least of primary workers - savings, and investment are
all relatively unresponsive to changes in wages and rates of return, and
therefore that the growth effects of most taxes are likely to be relatively
small. '
As an illustration of the results of some of the cross-country studies on the
relationship between taxation and economic growth, Figure 1 plots the
relationship between labour productivity growth and the ratio of total
taxes to GDP over the past 15 years for 21 industrialised OECD countries.
Labour productivity, or output per hour worked, seems like a more
accurate measure of a country's efficiency than GDP since it is a measure
of output against the input of effort. At the end of the day, only those
increases in GDP which flow from investment in more effective machin-
ery, a more skilled labour force, or better organization of work unambigu-
ously imply greater prosperity from a social point of view. If taxes
impaired the ability of a country to increase its prosperity, one would
expect to find countries clustered in the bottom right-hand portion of the
chart, illustrating that countries with higher-than-average tax ratios tend
to have lower rates of labour productivity growth. But no such pattern
emerges in Figure 1. Instead, countries are scattered throughout the chart.
Some low tax countries had higher than average rates of labour produc-
tivity growth over this period, such as Japan and Portugal, but so did some
117. Ireland, supra note 110 at 15.
118. Engen & Skinner, supra note 112 at 636.
119. P. Gerson, "The Impact of Fiscal Policy Variables on Output Growth" International
Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department, Working Paper 98/1 at 46 [available
at http://www.imf.org].
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high-tax countries, such as Finland, France and Sweden. Indeed, the
trendline suggests there is a correlation between higher taxes and higher
rates of labour productivity growth, although it is certainly not statisti-
cally significant.
Figure 1
Tax Levels and Labour Productivity
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Of course not much should be made of a correlation such as this even if
it were statistically significant. Because of cultural, demographic or other
factors, the rate of growth in Finland, for example, might have been much
higher if its taxes were lower, or perhaps at the beginning of the period
it started from a much lower level of GDP than most of the countries with
lower rates of productivity growth over the period and because of factors
unrelated to tax levels it was simply converging with them. Nevertheless,
the chart does call into question the simple-minded assertion that high
taxes are antithetical to economic growth.
In addition to so-called "top-down" studies that have investigated the
association between some measure of the aggregate extent of government
involvement in the economy and some measure of economic prosperity,
there is a related field of research that has developed over the past few
years exploring the political economy of economic growth. Among other
relationships, it has explored the relationship between income inequality
and economic growth. Contrary to the apparent view of the flat taxers,
namely that there is a trade-off to be made between equity and growth, this
research has found that equity and growth complement one another. A
striking empirical finding of this research project is the appearance of a
strong positive relationship across countries between the degree of
equality and the rate of long-term economic growth. A substantial
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theoretical literature has developed attempting to explain this finding. 20
It appears that inequality has many correlates that are likely to reduce
economic growth: political instability and unrest which discourages
investment; high crime rates resulting in a diversion of resources towards
enforcing law and order and away from more productive use; less
investment in human capital because low-income individuals will often
be unable to borrow to finance their training and education; lower levels
of demand for domestically produced goods and services; a reduction in
the general health and therefore productivity of lower-income families;
an unwillingness of workers to risk their economic security by engaging
in growth-enhancing structural changes; and, low levels of trust and
weakened norms of civic cooperation. Much of this research suggests that
to the extent progressive taxes and government transfers reduce inequal-
ity they will increase, not diminish, the rate of economic growth.
Neither the aggregate historical nor the international evidence provide
support for the proposition that high tax rates are detrimental to economic
prosperity. Looking at more direct evidence of the effect of taxes on
behaviour relevant to a country's rate of economic growth, what is known
about the effect of progressive taxes on how hard people work, how much
they save and invest, and whether or not they choose to migrate? The
evidence is overwhelming that taxes have negligible effects on these
choices.
d. Labour Supply: What Causes People to Work Hard?
Labour income, in the form of wages, salaries and benefits, makes up
almost 75 percent of national income; therefore, one of the most signifi-
cant ways that high marginal tax rates might reduce economic growth is
by reducing the amount that people work. This is precisely the argument
that flat taxers make. In concluding that high taxes cause individuals to
work less, flat taxers are presumably reasoning that if tax rates are high,
for each additional hour an individual works the less take-home pay they
have, therefore, the less they are likely to work. So, for example, if a
120. See generally A. Alesina & R. Perotti, "The Political Economy of Growth: A Critical
Survey of the Recent Literature" (1994) 8 World Bank Econ. Rev. 351; R. Benabou,
"Inequality and Growth" in B.S. Bernanke & J.J. Rotemberg, eds., NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 1996 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996) 11; A. Brandolini & N. Rossi, "Income Distribu-
tion and Growth in Industrial Countries" in V. Tanzi & K. Chu, eds., Income Distribution and
High-Quality Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998) 69; R. Perotti, "Growth, Income
Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say" (1996) 1 J. Econ. Growth 149; R. Perotti,
"Income Distribution and Investment" (1994) 38 Eur. Econ. Rev. 827.
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person can earn $100 for an extra hour of work, and the tax rate is only
30 percent, that will leave them with $70 after-tax and they might well
work the extra hour; however, if the tax rate is 60 percent, then they would
only be left with $40 after-tax and they might decide to watch television
instead of working the extra hour.
This result might seem intuitively correct: often individuals complain
that with high taxes it is not worth working overtime. However, although
some people might be inclined to substitute leisure for work when tax
rates are high (referred to in economic jargon as the substitution effect of
a price change), an equal number of people might be induced to work even
harder in order to earn a sufficient amount of income to maintain, or
achieve, their desired standard of living (the income effect of a price
change). This result is also intuitive and consistent with commonly
observed behaviour. Very likely, the high marginal tax rate will apply not
only to the income earned in the extra hour that a person might work, but
also to some part of the income they are already earning. In this case, the
tax will reduce their income and therefore their standard of living; to
maintain their standard of living they will have to work harder. To see the
intuitive force of the income effect, consider the result of a reduction in
taxes. Flat taxers predict that if taxes are reduced individuals will work
harder since they can earn more after tax for each hour worked. But
equally plausibly, since the reduction in taxes makes them richer, they
might instead take a longer vacation, retire a bit earlier, or go golfing
instead of taking on extra overtime. In many ways, a windfall due to a tax
reduction is similar to any other windfall such as winning a lottery or
inheriting some money. Most people who win a lottery or inherit money
do not respond by working harder.
The point is, as every basic economic textbook makes clear, a fall in
the after-tax wage rate simply does not lead to an unambiguous prediction
about the quantity of work effort supplied. Whereas the substitution
effect of a lower real wage could result in a reduction in effort, the income
effect pulls in the opposite direction. Economic theory is completely
silent on the question of which of these two opposing effects will
dominate. The case for the flat taxers' position, therefore, must be made
on empirical grounds. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence does not
support it.
One of the most telling pieces of empirical evidence that contradicts
the supply-siders central claim that higher after-tax wages will cause
workers to increase their supply of labour is that throughout most of the
20th century, although after-tax compensation has risen dramatically, the
annual labour supply per worker has fallen, not increased. From 1901 to
1981 the standard work week declined from almost 60 hours to less than
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40 hours.'21 Furthermore, the participation rate among males has fallen as
more men have withdrawn from the labour force and older workers have
retired earlier.'22 If the supply-siders' claims about the effect of increased
after-tax wages on workers' behaviour were correct, there should have
been a significant increase in hours worked over the past century. In fact,
it has only been over the past two decades, when wage growth has
stagnated, that the decline in hours of work and male participation rates
have levelled off.
Countless empirical studies examining the effect of taxes on labour
supply have been carried out. These typically take one of three forms:
(i) surveys in which workers are asked to give their opinion about the
effect of taxes on their work effort; (ii) studies of data involving samples
of individuals with different incomes, work effort and other characteris-
tics, in which an attempt is made, using econometric techniques, to
estimate the apparent effect of taxes on their work effort; and (iii) social
experiments involving situations in which tax rates on individuals have
been changed and the effect on their work effort observed.
Killingsworth, in his frequently referred to survey of the empirical
studies on the effect of taxes on labour supply,'23 published in the early
1980s, draws a distinction between first- and second-generation studies.
The first-generation studies were done in the 1960s and early 1970s using
survey data or experimental data derived from the early negative income
tax experiments. These sources suggest that taxation has an insignificant
effect on the total labour supply of high-income workers. A 1975 OECD
survey of the empirical work concluded unequivocally that "the net effect
of taxation on labour supply is not large enough to be of great economic
or sociological significance.' ' 24 In the second-generation studies, most of
which were econometric studies undertaken in the late 1970s and early
1980s, and are often associated with Heckman 25 and Hausman,' 26 taxes
where found to have a larger effect on labour supply. Two more recent
surveys of the studies, each of which emphasize different studies, reach
opposite conclusions. John Pencavel's 1986 survey concluded that the
121. D. Benjamin, M. Gunderson & W.C. Riddell, Labour Market Economics: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1988) at 35.
122. Ibid. at 31.
123. M.R. Killingsworth, Labor Supply (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
124. OECD, Theoretical and Empirical Aspects of the Effects of Taxation on Labor Supply
(Paris: OECD, 1975) at 126.
125. J. Heckman, "Shadow Prices, Market Wages, and Labor Supply" (1974) 42 Econo-
metrica 679.
126. J.A. Hausman, "Labor Supply" in H. Aaron & J. Pechman, eds., How Taxes Affect
Economic Behaviour (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981).
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work disincentive effects of tax rates were small. 127 Jerry Hausman, by
contrast, concluded in a 1985 survey that raising marginal tax rates on
high-income men led to a considerable adjustment in work behaviour. 28
Thomas McCurdy reviewed both of these surveys and after accounting
for methodological problems in the studies relied upon by Hausman,
concluded that raising upper-bracket tax rates is likely to induce rela-
tively minor adjustments in mens' hours of work. 29 Moreover, more
recent studies have been unable to replicate Heckman's and Hausman's
findings. They have confirmed the long-standing conventional wisdom
that even moderately high income tax rates have little effect on work
effort or related matters such as career choices. 30
In the United States, President Reagan enacted the second of his major
tax reform exercises in 1986. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the
top rate on labour income from 50 percent to 28 percent. This provided
an opportunity for researchers to gain some insight into labour supply
responses to tax reform. If tax rates have much effect on labour supply it
should have been evident from this wonderful natural experiment.
However, the results must have been disappointing to supply-siders. The
first study on the labour supply response to tax reform was undertaken by
Bosworth and Burtless. Remarkably, they found that after tax reform the
labour supply of men in the lowest-income categories increased by more
than those in the highest-income categories even though the marginal tax
rates on high-income men had been reduced and in many cases the
marginal tax rates of low-income individuals had been increased. 3'
127. J. Pencavel, "Labor Supply of Men: A Survey" in 0. Ashenfelter & R. Layard, eds.,
Handbook of Labor Economics (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986) 3.
128. J. Hausman, "Taxes and Labor Supply" in A. Auerbach& M. Feldstein, eds., Handbook
of Public Economics (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1985) 213.
129. T. MacCurdy, "Work Disincentive Effects of Taxes: A Reexamination of Some
Evidence" (1992) 82. Am. Econ. Rev.: Papers and Proc. (No. 2) 243.
130. See T. MacCurdy, D. Green, & H. Paarsch, "Assessing Empirical Approaches for
Analyzing Taxes and Labour Supply" (1990) 25 J. Hum. Resources 415 at 462 ("The results
of this study... raise serious questions about the reliability of evidence [Hausman's estimates]
cited by much of the literature to support recent tax reform proposals aimed at lowering
marginal tax rates .... According to the estimates [reported in this study]... all income and
substitution effects are essentially zero."); R.K. Triest, "The Effect of Income Taxation on
Labor Supply in the United States" (1990) 25 J. Hum. Resources 491 at 512-13 ("The results
of this paper suggest that the labor supply of prime-aged married men is relatively invariant to
the net wage and virtual income [Triest's results show the income coefficients driven to zero
in the maximum likelihood estimations] .... It seems safe to say that taxation causes fairly little
reduction in the labor supply of prime-aged married males in the United States.").
131. Supra note 104 at 12.
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These results, that tax reductions did not significantly alter the supply of
labour for high-income males, was confirmed in subsequent studies. 32
The Canadian studies have consistently found that both the compen-
sated and uncompensated elasticities of labour supply are small.'33 For
example, an econometric study by Eden Cloutier suggests that a reduc-
tion of after-tax wages would increase the labour supply of married
women in Canada by only two-tenths of 1 percent. The effect was even
smaller for men and single women. 3 4 In a recent exhaustive review of the
labour supply research in the United States and Canada, and an analysis
of labour supply behaviour in a Canadian negative income tax experi-
ment, Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson conclude:
Although precise measurement of labour supply response is a very
difficult problem, and one that economists and econometricians have not
yet mastered, we have narrowed the range of reasonable estimates to those
that indicate that individuals and families are likely to be fairly insensitive
to changes in the tax-transfer system facing them.'35
In addition to the offsetting income and substitution effects, taxation
presumably plays an uncertain role in work behaviour because after-tax
income is not the only variable that affects the decision to work. Work can
132. For example, Nada Eissa, using a micro-data set rather than time series data, concluded
that "micro-data from 1976 to 1993 show only weak evidence of a small increased male labour
supply response to the TRA of 1986." N. Eissa, "Tax Reforms and Labour Supply" in J.M.
Poterba, ed., Tax Policy and the Economy, vol 10 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996) 119 at 147.
See generally, A.J. Auerback & J. Slemrod, "The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of
1986" (1997) 35 J. Econ. Lit. 589 at 600-604.
133. See for example C.J. Eden, Taxes and Labour Supply of Married Women in Canada
(Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1986); J. Ham and C. Hsiao, "Two-Stage Estimation
of Structural Labor Supply Parameters Using Interval Data from the 1971 Canadian Census"
(1984) 24 J. Econometrics 133; A. Nakamura and M. Nakamura, "Part-Time and Full-Time
Work Behaviour of Married Women: A Model with a Doubly Truncated Dependent Variable"
(1983) 16 Can. J. Econ. 229. These studies and others are reviewed in S.A. Rea, "The Impact
of Taxes and Transfers on Labour Supply: A Review of the Evidence" in D.W. Conklin, ed.,
A Separate Personal Income Tax for Ontario: Background Studies (Toronto: Ontario Eco-
nomic Council, 1984) 106, and in L. Osberg, Behavioral Response in the Context of Socio-
Economic Microanalytic Simulation, a report to the Social and Economic Studies Division
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, April 1986). For an analytical review of tax effects on a number
of specific decisions related to labour supply see D.G. Hartle, A Separate Personal Income Tax
for Ontario: An Economic Analysis (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1984) c.8 at 333
("The general conclusion of this chapter is that labour supply considerations are important.
Nevertheless, the limited information available from the best current research suggests that the
labour supply effects of likely [income tax] changes are uncertain and probably fairly small.").
134. E. Cloutier, Taxes and the Labour Supply of Married Women in Canada (Ottawa:
Economic Council of Canada, 1986).
135. D. Hum & W. Simpson, Income Maintenance, Work Effort, and the Canadian Mincome
Experiment, a study prepared for the Economic Council of Canada (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services Canada, 1991) at 9 1. See also S. Phipps, "Does Unemployment Insurance
Increase Unemployment?" (1993) 1 Can. Bus. Econ. (No. 3) 37.
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be a source of enjoyment, satisfaction, status, and power. Noneconomic
considerations also have a great impact on choices that indirectly affect
a person's labour supply, such as marriage, childbearing, retirement,
training, education, and promotional opportunities.'36
Also, even to the extent that studies on the effect of taxes on the labour
supply of woikers suggest that workers generally might be somewhat
responsive to tax changes, they are likely to be relatively poor predictors
of what would happen if tax rates were flattened since they invariably
include workers in all income classes; only high-income workers would
benefit appreciably from a flattening of the tax rates. A number of
considerations suggest that high-income workers are likely to be less
sensitive to tax changes than other workers. This group of workers
includes people with high ambition who are most likely to derive
significant social standing and power from their professional lives.
Moreover, if my admittedly limited personal experience with high-
income individuals such as tax lawyers and corporate executives is any
guide, it is difficult to see how reducing their tax rates could increase their
work effort because they are already working long hours. By their own
account, these people work harder and longer hours than any other
workers. Certainly when one visits Bay Street office towers one does not
get a sense of mass malingering. When flat taxers claim that reducing
these people's taxes will cause them to work even harder, what are they
thinking? Indeed, arguably, if increasing the tax rates caused them to
work less the government would be doing them, their families, and
probably even the country, an immense favour. Another reason that
increased taxes are unlikely to affect the decision of many high-income
individuals to work is that much of their income likely reflects economic
rents attributable to scarce natural talents.'37
Finally, aside from the effect of reduced rates on the labour income of
high-income taxpayers, there are two reasons for thinking that flattening
the tax rates will in fact decrease aggregate labour supply instead of
increasing it or even leaving it unchanged. First, since a reduction in
marginal tax rates will increase the after-tax return of not only income
from labour but also income from capital, it is important to consider what
effect an increase in the after-tax return to capital will have on labour
136. For a discussion of the complex psychological and other factors underlying the decision
to work see S.E.G. Lea, R.M. Tarpy & P. Webley, The Individual in the Economy: A Survey
of Economic Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) c. 6.
137. See R. Krouse & M. McPherson, "Capitalism, 'Property-Owning Democracy', and the
Welfare State" in A. Gutmann, ed., Democracy and the Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988) 79 at 97.
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supply. Here, economic theory is unambiguous. A reduction in taxes on
capital income will tend to lower the labour supply since it will only have
an income, and not a substitution, effect on the choice of how many hours
to work or whether to work at all. In terms of its effect on labour supply,
a tax cut on existing capital income is exactly like winning a lottery that
pays a prize equal to the reduction in taxes.
Second, if the tax rates are flattened, the marginal tax rates for high-
income individuals are reduced, but the marginal tax rates for low-
income individuals must therefore be increased to secure the same
amount of revenue. A substantial number of low-income workers are
likely as unresponsive to tax rates as high-income workers. However, a
large number of low-income workers are married women and the empiri-
cal evidence suggests that they are more responsive to tax rate changes
than men. '38 There are a number of possible explanations for the respon-
siveness of married women to changes in effective wage rates. First,
while men who enter the work force receive strong social approval,
married women with children who enter the work force may face social
indifference or disapproval. Second, women will often have low-paying
service jobs like sales clerking or serving which permit easy exit and
entrance. Finally, married women in two-income households are likely to
be the low-income earning spouse, and thus family income will be
maximized if her contribution takes the form of untaxed, imputed
household services. It has been estimated empirically that because of the
greater responsiveness of women than men to tax rate changes, a
reduction in the progressivity of the tax system that increases the rates of
tax on low-income workers is likely to reduce overall labour supply. 13 9
e. Savings Behaviour: What Determines How Much People Save?
In addition to increasing the labour supply, another channel through
which lowering taxes on the rich will lead to greater economic prosperity,
according to the flat-taxers, is by increasing the rate of private savings in
Canada. A higher level of private saving will lead, it is argued, to a higher
level of capital formation. This in turn will make Canadian workers more
138. The studies are referred to in D. Benjamin, M. Gunderson & W.C. Riddell, Labour
Market Economics: Theory, Evidence, and Policy in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill,
1988) at 51-55.
139. P. Apps, "A Tax-Mix Change: Effects on Income Distribution, Labour Supply and
Saving Behaviour" in J. Head & R. Krever, eds., Taxation Towards 2000 (Sydney: Australian
Tax Foundation, 1997) 103.
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productive and ultimately all Canadians will enjoy a higher standard of
living.
This argument for flat taxes rests upon a number of assumptions: that
the rate of household savings is low in Canada and should be increased
as a matter of policy; that reducing tax rates on the return to savings will
increase the rate of savings; that increased savings will lead to increased
investment; and, that increased investment achieved by reducing the tax
rate on income from capital will lead to a more productive economy.
Every one of these assumptions is questionable.
The first link in the argument is that the saving rate in Canada is too
low, and should be increased as a matter of policy. In thinking about
whether the rate of savings is too low (or too high), it is important to
remember that, whatever the rate, whether collectively members of a
society should consume less and save more is a value judgment. The
trade-off implicit in increasing savings involves reducing the consump-
tion of the current generation to increase the consumption of subsequent
generations. The ethical judgment underlying this trade-off might seem
uncontentious, particularly if it is being made by the current generation,
and if it involves reduced current consumption for those who are
otherwise well-off. However, just as likely, if the progressivity of the
present tax system is reduced in order to increase savings, the present
consumption that is forgone will be that of poor people to whom
government transfer payments might be made or that of low-income
beneficiaries of public health services and education. The members of the
future generation who are most likely to benefit from the increased
consumption allowed them, because the consumption of these low-
income members of the present generation have been reduced, are likely
to be the children of those who are otherwise well-off in this current
generation. If it is the poorer members of the current generation who are
affected by government policies designed to reduce current consumption,
and the children of the rich who eventually benefit, then the value
judgment about the need to increase household savings becomes more
problematic.
In making the argument for increased saving, business spokespersons
often use an undifferentiated "we." They say things like, "We are
enjoying a higher and higher standard of living by our excessive con-
sumption, at the expense of our children." But in Tonto's immortal words
to the Lone Ranger, "What do you mean 'we,' paleface?" The average
Canadian worker's standard of living has hardly improved at all in the last
decade-indeed, real wages for workers have declined. By and large it is
only the rich who have been enjoying a higher standard of living.
350 The Dalhousie Law Journal
It is easy to feel moralistic about our obligations to future generations,
if one is a relatively well-off member of this generation. However, if one
is a deprived member of this generation then it is not clear why one should
be so concerned about increasing the well-being of future generations.
Indeed, it has always struck me as somewhat odd that the economists who
purport to be the most concerned about the well-being of future genera-
tions are often the same ones who seem to care the least for the most
unfortunate members of the present generation.
The second link in the argument that taxes on the rich have to be
reduced so they will save more and make us all better off in the long run
is that reducing the tax on income from capital will cause high-income
taxpayers to save more. But even if the social judgment were made that
private savings should be increased, it is unlikely that reducing the tax on
income from capital would have that effect.
The difficulty with predicting the precise effect of taxes on savings
behaviour is that no one knows for sure why people save. Until that
question is answered, it is difficult to construct a coherent theory of
saving. Economists generally assume that people save for future con-
sumption. Thus they have developed theories like the "life-cycle" hy-
pothesis and the "permanent income" hypothesis. 4 ° Under the first
hypothesis, people save to produce a level stream of consumption from
an income that peaks in midlife. Under the second hypothesis, people
save when their transitory income is above their permanent income.
These hypotheses concentrate on forms of saving that aim to combat the
predictable variations in income over a consumer's lifetime. However,
ordinary experience suggests that the savings decision is much more
complex than these theories suggest.' 4' Such factors as the desire to
bequeath, inflation, wealth, habit, cultural norms, availability of credit,
quality of public institutions, availability of private and public insurance,
and the myriad of reasons why saving might be a goal in itself, all can
affect saving behaviour and yet are unaccounted for in the simply "saving
for future consumption" models. One way to think about the complexity
of the saving decisions is to note that the decision as to what portion of
income to save is the obverse of the decision of how much to spend. The
decision of how much to spend is typically made after a whole host of
140. For a description of these theories see any good text on macroeconomics, for example,
R. Dornburch, S. Fisher, & G. Sparks, Macroeconomics, 3rd Canadian ed. (Toronto: McGraw-
Hill Ryerson, 1989) at c. 8.
141. See K.E. Warneryd, "On the Psychology of Saving: An Essay on Economic Behavior"
(1989) 10 J. Econ. Psychol. 515.
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considerations, as every consumer knows from common experience. The
fact that savings rates vary dramatically from country to country in a way
that cannot be accounted for in standard economic models also illustrates
the complexity underlying the psychology of saving. Given the richness
of the savings choice, the question must remain empirical and perhaps
economists will never be able to bring theory to bear on the data.
The application of price theory to savings behaviour compounds
instead of resolves the theoretical uncertainty over whether taxes affect
savings behaviour. Price theory leads to a prediction that an increase in
taxes on income from savings will increase or decrease or have no effect
on the amount taxpayers save. According to basic microeconomic theory,
taxation affects household saving decisions in much the same way as it
does labour supply decisions: There is a substitution and an income
effect. On the one hand, if the tax on savings is reduced, some will save
more because the price of saving has been reduced; in effect, because the
price is reduced they will substitute more retirement income, for example,
for current consumption. On the other hand, if the tax on savings is
reduced, some will save less because they will be able to meet their
retirement goals with smaller savings. The net effect of the substitution
and income effect on savings is ambiguous in theory; therefore, it is
necessary to turn to the empirical evidence.
Everyday experience, particularly during the recent stock market
boom, would appear to suggest that many people are target savers, that is,
they set a specific target for savings in order to achieve a certain level of
wealth at retirement. The standard economic life cycle approach to saving
assumes that people will attempt to spread their income out over their
lifetime to maximize their lifetime well-being, therefore, if they earn
more on their investments, or if taxes on their income from capital is
reduced, they will spend some now and some will be saved. But
increasingly one hears of people anxious to simply accumulate enough
money so they can retire. They are not interested in maximizing their
income over their lifetime. They appear to have set themselves a living
standard that they wish to maintain and then save in order to realize that
standard throughout their lives. Naturally, they would prefer to enjoy that
standard of living without the need to work. Therefore, providing these
people with a tax break, or an increase in the after-tax rate of return they
can earn on investments, simply means they will work less, save less, or
retire earlier.
A piece of casual empirical evidence that must cause some concern to
those who argue that savings are responsive to tax rates is the fact that the
savings rates in most countries have remained relatively constant through
most of recent history, despite significant changes in interest rates and
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other variables. Over the last two decades there have been large changes
in real interest rates. In the mid- and late-1970s real interest rates,
especially after tax, were often negative. In the 1980s real interest rates
rose to levels that were almost unprecedented. Yet the private savings rate
did not exhibit such movement or volatility. It seems implausible,
therefore, that the response of savings to changes in interest rates is large.
As mentioned earlier, in the United States during the early 1980s tax rates
on investment income were reduced significantly; new tax incentives
were provided for savers; inflation fell, leaving real rates of return at
historically high levels; and, there was financial deregulation. According
to their proponents, these incentives should have dramatically increased
the rate of savings. The surprise is that the private savings rate actually fell
in the 1980s after being constant for decades.
Furthermore, if there were a relationship between taxes and savings
rates one might expect to find it reflected in the experience of OECD
countries. Industrialized countries vary considerably in their relative
reliance on overall consumption taxes, on general sales taxes like VATs
or retail sales taxes, and on income taxes. Also, there has been consider-
able change in the use of these taxes in some countries. Yet regressions
for a number of years and time periods for each of these measures in
conjunction with the national saving rate, the private saving rate, and the
household saving rate in each country, reveal no significant relation-
ships. 142
Consonant with experience and casual empirical observation, the
empirical research on the effect of taxes on private savings was, until the
1970s, unanimous in finding that private savings are nearly insensitive to
the after-tax rate of return on capital income. Colin Wright summed up
the previous work on this question in 1969 by noting that "no evidence
exists which supports the hypothesis that the substitution effect upon
consumption of changes in the rate of interest is negative." 43 Then, in the
late 1970s and early 1980s a few researchers, most notably Michael
Boskin' 4 and Lawrence Summers, 145 purported to find that reducing top
marginal tax rates could have a relatively dramatic effect in increasing
142. See K. Militzer & I. Ontscherenki, "The Value Added Tax: Its Impact on Saving" (1990)
25 Bus. Econ. 32.
143. C. Wright, "Saving and the Rate of Interest" in A.C. Harberger & M.J. Bailey, eds., The
Taxation of Income from Capital (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969) 275 at 285.
See also, A.S. Blinder, "Distributional Effects and the Aggregate Consumption Function"
(1975) 83 J. Pol. Econ. 447.
144. See M.J. Boskin, "Taxation, Saving, and the Rate of Interest" (1978) 86 J. Pol. Econ. S3.
145. L.H. Summers, "Capital Taxation and Accumulation in a Life Cycle Growth Model"
(1981) 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 533 (finding a savings elasticity of about 2 on the basis not of
empirical testing, but of a simulation exercise with a highly restrictive savings model).
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household savings. They estimated elasticities in the range between 0.4
and somewhere above 1.0. The findings of Boskin and Summers prompted
intense research over the next decade into the empirical magnitude of the
relevant elasticity of savings. Their results were challenged by almost
every subsequent researcher. Howrey and Hymans146 checked to see how
sensitive Boskin's findings were to changes in the time period for the
estimate and to changes in the measure of the rate of return employed.
They found his results were not robust. Using several other real rates of
return and restricting the time period to the post-war period they found
negative interest elasticities of saving.'47 They also made their own
estimates and concluded, "[flhere are many good reasons for tax reform,
but there is no good evidence to support the view that a positive interest
elasticity of loanable-funds saving is one of them."'' 41 Irwin Friend and
Joel Hasbrouck took even stronger exception to Boskin's findings. In the
introduction to their study they boldly state: "This paper will demonstrate
that there is little scientific justification for the recent literature purporting
to show a strong positive interest elasticity of saving ... 49 Barry
Bosworth used a specification similar to Boskin's and using data from
1952-80 came up with similar results. 50 But when the period was
restricted to 1952-70 the interest elasticity of saving was insignificantly
different from zero.' 5 ' Bosworth also notes that his equations, like
Boskin's, severly overpredicted savings for the early 1980s. During this
period real interest rates went through the roof, while saving rates actually
fell. Bosworth concluded, "[a]ssertions that an increase in the return to
capital will or will not raise the overall private savings rate must be based
on personal beliefs, because the existing empirical evidence must be
judged as inconclusive."' 52
146. E.P. Howrey & S.H. Hymans, "The Measurement and Determination of Loanable-
Funds Savings" in J.A. Pechman, ed., What Should Be Taxed: Income or Expenditure
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980) 1.
147. Ibid. at 13.
148. Ibid. at31.
149. I. Friend & J. Hasbrouck, "Saving and After-Tax Rates of Return" (1983) 65 Rev. Econ.
& Stat. 537.
150. B.P. Bosworth, Tax Incentives and Economic Growth (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1984) at 79ff.
151. Ibid. at 82.
152,. Ibid. at 84.
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Numerous other recent research studies,'53 the conclusions of several
comprehensive literature reviews of studies on savings behaviour, 54 and
the conclusion reached by the authors of leading macroeconomic text-
books, 55 have upheld the traditional view that the aggregate savings
elasticity is close to zero: personal savings show little, if any, positive
response to increases in after-tax returns on investment. As Barry
Bosworth has recently noted, "There is only one study that I know of in
the U.S. that is able to find a positive effect of interest rates on savings.
One outstanding characteristic of it is that no one has ever been able to
replicate it and there is no matching result that I know of."' 56
The third link in the argument that lower taxes on income from savings
will increase the rate of economic growth is that increased savings will be
invested in productive investment in Canada. However, even if the
private rate of savings were to increase somewhat if tax rates were
flattened, there are a number of reasons for doubting whether this would
have a significant positive impact on real productive investment, and
153. See for example O.J. Evans, "Tax Policy, the Interest Elasticity of Saving, and Capital
Accumulation: Numerical Analysis of Theoretical Models" (1983) 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 398
(challenges the robustness of Summer's simulation results on several grounds); R.E. Hall,
"Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption" (1988) 96 J. Pol. Econ. 339 (finding no saving
response to increased interest returns and explaining away apparent findings that savings
respond to increased interest); J. Skinner & D. Feenberg, "The Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform
on Personal Saving" in J. Slemrod, ed., Do Taxes Matter? The Impact of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990) 50 (The Tax Reform Act of 1986 resulted in relatively
little change in aggregate personal savings but seems to have had some effect on the
composition of personal saving; for example, contributions to IRAs fell drastically after tax
reform).
154. B.B. Aghevli, et al., The Role of National Saving in the World Economy: Recent Trends
and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1990) at 20 and 31 ("the
weight of the empirical evidence... supports the view that the partial correlation between the
interest rate and the saving rate is likely to be small, irrespective of the sign" and "on the whole,
the effect of taxes on the level of private saving has been relatively small"); A.L. Bovenberg,
"Tax Policy and National Saving in the United States: A Survey" (1989) 42 Nat'l Tax J. 123,
at 128 ("Empirical studies on the interest elasticity of saving generally suggest that interest
rates have only a small direct impact on saving in the United States."); R.S. Smith, "Factors
Affecting Savings, Policy Tools and Tax Reform: A Review" (1990) 37 International Monetary
Fund: Staff Papers I at 57 ("there are no clear guidelines on how to alter the rate of private
saving"); D.A. Starrett, "Effects of Taxes on Savings" in H.J. Aaron, H. Galper & J.A.
Pechman, eds., Uneasy Compromise: Problems of Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988) 237 at 265 ("While statistical evidence of an
association between savings and rates of return can be uncovered, I find the empirical
relationship more tenuous than the theoretical arguments suggest.").
155. See for example supra, note 140 at 281 ("Typically, research suggests the effects [of a
rise in interest rates on saving] are small and certainly hard to find.").
156. B. Bosworth, "The Debate Over Savings" in B.L. Fisher & R.S. McIntyre, eds., Growth
& Equity: Tax Policy Challenges for the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: Citizens for Tax Justice,
1990) 83 at 87-88.
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hence on competitiveness and growth. Some part of increased household
savings would be invested in assets such as land, valuable paintings and
other collectibles, and owner-occupied housing that do not result directly
in the production of additional goods and services. In particular, if there
are not enough sound productive investment opportunities in the economy
for savings already available, new savings are likely to be used for
speculation or investments in items of conspicuous consumption.
More importantly, in a small and open economy like Canada's, there
might be little connection between domestic savings and domestic
investment because increased savings can flow overseas and finance
foreign capital development. Increased saving by Canadians would be
put to use financing Canadian investment only if its returns were higher
than the returns obtainable elsewhere. If increased domestic savings
stayed in Canada, domestic interest rates might fall in the short term. But
if they fell appreciably below the international rates, Canadian investors,
faced with a low return of funds at home, would simply invest abroad.
Conversely, if domestic demand for savings outstrips supply, and interest
rates are pushed appreciably higher than international rates, foreign funds
will flow into Canada in search of the higher returns, driving the domestic
rate down to its appropriate international level. Thus, notwithstanding the
domestic savings rate, the increasing internationalisation of financial
markets effectively caps the domestic cost of capital. Most analysts have
concluded that in an open economy changes in the equilibrium interest
rate can largely be ignored because of the elastic supply of foreign
savings. Arbitrage between countries will push pre-tax returns toward
equality. Consequently, in an open economy such as Canada's, any tax
concession for saving is likely only to transfer wealth from those who do
not save to those who do. The GNP might rise since the income of savers
will increase, but the rate of investment will not change. Accordingly, no
other Canadians will benefit from these additional savings.
Finally, even if an increase in domestic savings can affect the cost of
capital at home, it is not clear that the cost of capital is an important
determinant of new investment. The most important factor a business
person takes into account when deciding whether to make a new invest-
ment is the expected demand for the firm's products. However, econo-
mists have long insisted that, in theory, business investment is determined
not only by the expected growth in a firm's sales (the accelerator) but also
by the cost of capital (the price of capital goods and the cost of borrowing
or otherwise acquiring funds to pay for them). Unfortunately for eco-
nomic theory, empirically, it has been remarkably difficult to explain
actual investment behaviour by changes in the cost of capital.
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Like the empirical research on the effect of taxes on both labour supply
and savings decisions, until the late 1970s and early 1980s the studies
relating to investment decisions were almost unanimous in finding that
changes in tax laws had little effect. In their 1985 edition, the authors of
the leading macroeconomic text in the United States and Canada asserted:
At least on evidence through 1979, it seems that the cost of capital
empirically does not much affect investment and that accordingly the
simple accelerator model [investment is determined by demand for output]
does as well as the neoclassical model [the cost of capital and expected
output determines investment] at explaining investment. 57
However, in the early 1980s, studies by Martin Feldstein and others 58
purported to show that the cost of capital does affect investment. This
caused the authors of the macroeconomic text referred to above to revise
their assessment of the evidence slightly in their most recent edition and
to admit of some uncertainty in the results of the empirical research. 59
However, still, the most reasonable conclusion from the evidence is that
at best the cost of capital has some effect on business investment in plant
and equipment but that these effects are modest and occur gradually over
a long period.' 6° Thus, scepticism is warranted concerning not only the
responsiveness of saving to the after-tax rate of return, but also the
responsiveness of investment to the cost of capital.
The last link in the chain of argument assumed by the proposition that
shifting to a consumption tax will foster economic prosperity is that
private capital investment will increase the rate of economic growth.
Generally, other things being equal, a country is better off with a larger
capital stock. However, the claims made by business groups and right-
wing governments about the importance of increasing private investment
are often exaggerated.
Growth accounting, a branch of economic research that has attempted
to identify the sources of economic growth and measure their effect, has
157. R. Dombusch, S. Fischer, & G.R. Sparks, Macroeconomics, 2nd Canadian ed. (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1985) at 277.
158. Referred to in R. Dornbusch, supra note 140 at 63.
159. Ibid. at 316-17 ("It is clear from the conflicting findings that the evidence is not strong
enough to decide the precise relative roles of the cost of capital and expectations of future
output.").
160. See supra note 150 at 109-110. For more recent studies compare M. Rushton, "Tax
Policy and Business Investment: What Have We Learned in the Past Dozen Years?" (1992) 40
Can. Tax J. 639 at 640 ("our knowledge of the effects of tax incentives on investment has not
advanced in recent years") with J.G. Cummins & K.A. Hassett, "The Effects of Taxation on
Investment: New Evidence from Firm Fuel Panel Data" (1992) 45 Nat'l Tax J. 243 ("We
conclude that there is a significant relationship between the cost of capital and equipment
investment.").
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been unable to discover a strong association between capital investment
and economic performance. In 1957, Robert Solow, in a study that was
in large part responsible for his later selection as a Nobel Prize laureate,
estimated that over 80 percent of the growth in output per labour hour in
the United States had been due to factors other than growth in the input
of capital per labour hour. 161 Subsequent studies have confirmed Solow's
initial finding that capital accumulation accounts for only a relatively
small fraction of productivity growth. 62 For example, in a frequently
relied upon study, Barry Bosworth concluded that only 0.1 to
0.2 percentage points of the productivity slowdown in the United States
in the late 1970s could be assigned to differing rates of change in the
capital-labour rate. 163 According to standard estimates, even a doubling
of the U.S. net private investment rate would raise the growth rate of real
income by less than half of a percentage point per year. Although there
have been studies questioning these results, most notably in work done by
Dale Jorgenson and his associates,' 64 a recent survey of the literature
concludes that the standard model's estimates do not need to be revised
upward on the basis of subsequent developments in theory and empirical
analysis. 165
f. Migration: What Keeps Talented Individuals in Canada?
The most recent strategy of those who have been advocating lower taxes
on the rich has been to invoke the spectre of a "brain drain.'' 6  Allegedly,
161. R. Solow, "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function" (1957) 70 Q. J.
Econ. 65.
162. See for example E.F. Denison, Trends in American Economic Growth, 1929-1982
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985).
163. Supra note 150 at 29.
164. See D.W. Jorgenson, F.M. Gollop, & B. Fraumeni, Productivity and U.S. Economic
Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
165. M.N. Bailey & C.L. Schultze, "The Productivity of Capital in a Period of Slower
Growth" in M.N. Bailey & C. Winston, eds., Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:
Microeconomics 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990)369. See also Dombusch,
supra note 158 at 648 ("The early finding by Solow that growth in the capital stock makes a
minor, though not negligible, contribution to growth stands up well to the test of later
research."), and J. Stiglitz, "Comments: Some Retrospective Views on Growth Theory" in P.A.
Diamond, ed., Growth, Productivity, Unemployment: Essays to Celebrate Bob Solow's
Birthday (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990) 50 at 53 ("These results [Solow's 1957 findings that
the rate of savings was likely to have only a small effect on the growth rate of the economy]
... have held up remarkably well to more than three decades of extensive and thorough
investigation.").
166. Traditionally, the phrase "brain drain" was applied to the movement of talented people
from developing to industrialized countries. See J.N. Bhagwati & K. Hamada, "ATax Policy
in the Presence of Emigration" (1982) 18 J. Pub. Econ. 291.
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as a result of the much higher taxes in Canada on high-income, talented
and mobile individuals, brainy Canadians have been leaving in droves for
the United States. In its 1997 economic survey of Canada, the OECD
raised the issue in a chapter on reforming the Canadian tax system; 167
around the tabling of the 1998 federal budget, which much to the
disappointment of the flat taxers contained no broad-based tax cuts, the
opposition members raised the issue constantly in the House of Com-
mons; 168 and, over the past year, the popular press has shown an abnormal
preoccupation with reporting anecdotal stories of high-income Canadi-
ans who have migrated to the United States.
69
. Migration is not, of course, a marginal decision: it is an all-or-nothing
proposition. People either migrate or they do not. Thus, in making the
decision to migrate, what is important to people is not the tax they will pay
on the next dollar they earn, but the overall taxes they pay. Consequently,
167. OECD, Economic Surveys, 1996-1997, Canada (Paris: OECD, 1997) c. 4 (Of the many
expressions of concern in this chapter about the effect of progressive taxes on the migration of
high-income individuals see, for example, at 84: "Some types of labour might be relatively
mobile, such as entrepreneurs, executives, or professionals. If so, imposing high taxes on them
for, say, redistributive purposes, can be partially frustrated, a consideration that is particularly
relevant for Canada because of the proximity of the United States.").
168. See for example House of Commons Debates (26 February 1998) at 4469 ("The biggest
single looming social issue that threatens the future competitiveness of Canada is our brain
drain, the loss of our brightest and best to the U.S."); House of Commons Debates (24 March
1998) at 5246 ( "What has happened is that we see these Canadian taxpayers, these geese who
are laying these golden eggs, looking to the south. They are starting to say 'We are Canadian
geese. We do not want to go south, but unfortunately we are being forced to consider this option
because we have mouths to feed.' They have all these goslings that have to be looked after. They
have to feed the people they are responsible for. They are starting to cast about for other
alternatives."); House of Commons Debates (26 March 1998) at 5397 ("We need tax relief to
keep our best and brightest in Canada and to stop the brain drain that is sapping the lifeblood
from Canada's future."); House of Commons Debates (26 March 1998) at 5384 ("we have a
number of members in this House who have had family members flee the country as economic
refugees because they not only cannot find jobs here but, even if they do find a job here, the
taxes are so much higher than in a similarjob in another country. Many of us have seen friends
go to the United States where it has taxes that are about one-third less than what we have in
Canada."); House of Commons Debates (2 April 1998) at 5687 ("We have heard a lot about
brain drain. It devastates Canada's sustainability as a technology leader. It deprives Canadian
industries of the ability to remain competitive. Above all, and what we can never forget, is that
brain drain rips the heart and soul out of Canada and its families."); House of Commons Debates
(2 April 1998) at 5687 ("If the finance minister wants to become Prime Minister of this country
he should realize that we have to be competitive on a tax basis with the United States or we are
going to continue to lose our best and brightest to the United States.").
169. See for example Editorial, "Smart way to stem the brain drain" The Financial Post
(16 May 1998) 20; C. Goar, "Grads need reasons to stay in Canada" The Toronto Star (6 June
1998) C2; M. Janigan, "The tax wars: pressure on governments to cut rates is rising" Macleans
(8 June 1998) 22; and N. Nankivell, "Brain drain reason enough to cut taxes" The Financial
Post (II June 1998) 21.
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anxiety about the effect of taxes on migration does not reflect a concern
about the progressivity of marginal income tax rates, but a concern about
the overall level of taxes or a concern about the progressivity of average
rates of tax.
It is the case that overall tax levels in the United States are lower than
in Canada. The OECD reports that in 1995 total taxes in Canada were
37.2 percent of GDP, while in the United States they were only 27.9
percent.170 Unless the United States tax system were substantially more
progressive than the Canadian tax system, one would expect that gener-
ally high-income individuals would pay less tax in the United States than
in Canada. Nevertheless, press reports often overstate the differential by
comparing, for example, the top combined federal and provincial income
tax rate in Canada, about 50 percent, with the top U.S. federal income tax
rate of about 40 percent. For one thing, although 7 states do not have
personal income taxes, the rest do, and the highest marginal rates in the
various states range from 5 to II percent, with an average of about
7 percent. Also, the American income tax system has numerous "phase-
outs" that substantially increase marginal rates over middle-income
earners and the average rate of high-income earners. The best known is
the phase-out of the 15 percent bracket, but, in addition, the following tax
concessions phase-out: the personal exemption, the deduction for contri-
butions to IRS, the ability to claim net losses attributable to certain
passive activities, and the child-care tax credit. As well as these explicit
phase-outs, the floor under a number of deductions, such as the deduction
for investment and employee business expenses and medical expenses
and casualty losses, can give rise to implicit phase-outs. Also, the U.S. has
higher social security taxes than Canada. Further, it has a wealth transfer
tax that falls exclusively on high-income individuals. Tax comparisons
are notoriously difficult to make and often depend upon the individual
circumstances of the taxpayer. Nevertheless, although individuals are
likely to pay less tax in the U.S. than in Canada it is not as much as often
contended. 171
Moreover, in addition to the taxes they pay, in deciding whether to
migrate individuals presumably consider the benefits they receive from
their taxes. Many goods and services that are paid for through taxes in
170. OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-1996 (Paris: OECD, 1997) at 75.
171. Professional athletes sometimes complain that taxes in Canada are higher, but in fact
professional tax advisors contend that with tax planning the amount paid in taxes by
professional athletes in Canada is about the same as that paid in the U.S. See T. Van Alphen,
"Athletes have got it wrong, say tax advisers" The Toronto Star (2 March 1998) D1.
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Canada must be purchased in the private sector in the United States.
Health care services are an obvious example. In addition to goods and
services that provide direct benefits, higher taxes also purchase less
tangible benefits such as safe streets, liveable cities, economic security
and a more equal distribution of income and wealth, all of which are
valued even, presumably, by high-income individuals. That is to say,
while it might be true that taxes are higher in Canada than in the United
States, many people are likely to find their Canadian taxes to be good
value. A low-tax country may actually be unattractive to individuals if
low taxes mean an inadequate supply of public goods and services that
people value.
Sociological studies on migration behaviour suggest that the primary
motive for moving is job related. Some people move because of quality
of life factors, some move to be closer to friends and relatives and a few
might move because they receive too few benefits from government in
relation to the taxes they pay, but most move because of employment
opportunities. 72 This finding would appear to be supported by most of the
anecdotal evidence reported in the press about the "brain drain."
Typical of the press stories is one by Edward Greenspon, The Globe
and Mail's Ottawa bureau chief. 73 In reporting that high-skilled workers
are leaving because of high taxes in Canada, he relied mainly upon Herb
Grubel, a right-wing economist at Simon Fraser University, former MP
and Reform Party finance critic, and a fierce tax fighter. In the story, the
only expatriate he quoted as saying that he left because of taxes in Canada
was Herb Grubel's son, a corporate manager who claims he moved from
Toronto to Los Angeles because of the lower taxes and mortgage-interest
deductibility in the U.S. However, even he tonceded that if it were not so
expensive he would like to move back to Canada since "Canada is such
a great place ... " Parenthetically, it might have occurred to him that it
was the public services that in part made Canada "such a great place."
Professor Grubel's son's step-sister, who was also interviewed for the
story, and had moved to Los Angeles to further her career as an animator,
said that she only moved because of the job opportunities and added that,
"I would rather pay the extra taxes if I knew that people would be better
taken care of down here. I think there are some quite awful things that
happen here in terms of people not being able to get proper medical
172. For a summary of the studies see A.C. Michalos, "Migration and the Quality of Life:
A Review Essay" (1997) 39 Soc. Indicators Res. 121.
173. E. Greenspon, "Why some of our brightest are heading south" The Globe and Mail
(28 February 1998) Al.
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treatment and the disparity between very rich people and very poor
people." She went on to say that she prefers the more equal distribution
of wealth in Canada and that, "I would pay more taxes if I could be back
in a system like that. But there are just more possibilities down here for
me to work in my business." Almost everyone else referred to in the story
claimed that to the extent there was increased emigration of skilled
Canadians to the U.S. it was largely because of the job opportunities.
Recent news stories have reported an increasing number of young
lawyers going to New York.'74 Some are attracted by the larger salaries
in New York, but many apparently go to New York not for the money, but
because they feel that the legal work in New York will be more
challenging and exciting. New York is on the of the world's major
financial centres. The New York law firms tend to be involved in the
largest corporate mergers and acquisitions and the most innovative
corporate financing deals. Many have offices around the world. Basi-
cally, it appears that Canadian law students are going to New York for the
same reasons that dedicated law students interested in corporate law from
all over the United States migrate to New York and law students
sometimes leave smaller cities in Canada and migrate to Toronto. In the
same way that reducing taxes in Halifax will not halt the movement of
some students with an interest in business law to Toronto, reducing taxes
in Toronto will not halt the movement to New York. 15
Medical and health professionals have also been reported to be
migrating in increasing numbers to the United States. But again, flatten-
ing the tax rates would do little to keep them in Canada. The suggestion
from the interviews with doctors reported in the press is that they leave
Canada not because of the taxes but to engage in more advanced and
sophisticated research in the United States'76 and because of the uncer-
tainty, frustration and anxiety created by the hospital restructuring and
cut backs in health funding in Canada.'77 Amounts spent on health
research at some large United States hospitals are alone greater than that
spent by the federal government. Federal government health spending in
174. A. Keller, "Bidding adieu to the best and brightest" The Globe and Mail (15 August
1998) Dl.
175. For another story about Canadians leaving for New York for the "risk-taking and
adventure" see K. Kenna, "Canadians take a shine to the Big Apple" The Toronto Star (5 July
1998) Al.
176. C. Abraham, "Canadian doctors take their talent south: top doctors are moving to U.S.
hospitals that offer unlimited research money and a chance to practice cutting-edge medicine"
The Globe and Mail ( 11 July 1998) AI; Editorial, "Stingy budgets uproot medical stars" The
Toronto Star (13 August 1998) A20.
177. L. Papp, "Top gene scientist heading to the US" The Toronto Star (5 August 1998) Al.
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the United States rose from $40 per capita in 1991 to $67 in 1997 while
over the same period it fell from $8.70 to $8.20 per capita in Canada.'78
The Canadian Medical Association claims that the exodus of doctors is
caused in large part because "doctors feel thwarted by closed hospitals,
outdated and insufficient equipment and research cuts.' 7 9 Moreover, to
some doctors medical practice in the U.S. is simply more exciting. One
doctor described to a newspaper reporter how on his first day at a New
York hospital, "he followed the chief resident surgeon around the
emergency room half giddy with excitement. There were gunshots and
stab wounds and operations right through the crazy New York City night,
and he thought, 'Wow. This is wonderful."" 80 Does Canada really want
to create the apparent conditions that make doctors giddy with excitement
in order to keep them here! Large numbers of nurses have left Canada in
recent years, but no one has suggested that they have left because of taxes
in Canada. They have left because they could not find work in Canada,
due in large part to government cutbacks for health services.
It appears that, somewhat ironically, many of those who stand to make
the most important contribution to Canada's future-research scientists,
mathematicians and physicists - have been leaving in the past few years,
not because of low after-tax salaries in Canada, but because of the
government's refusal to fund basic research or to otherwise show a public
commitment to Canadian science and technology."'8 Even in newspaper
stories written as part of the campaign to try to convince the government
to lower taxes the people interviewed often confess that it was lack of
funding and better job opportunities that lead them to the U.S. For
example, in a story headed, "Why a top B.C. researcher joined the brain
drain," the migrant, Dr. Christian Fibiger, who left the University of
British Columbia to join U.S. pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly, although he
took the opportunity to rail against the Canadian tax system, stated that,
"money was not my primary reason for my leaving. My primary reason
was the opportunity. I can live my scientific dreams and aspirations
here."'82 A survey undertaken for the Canadian Advanced Technology
Alliance asked over 1,000 high-tech workers to identify the factors that
were most important in luring them to their current job. The most
178. Editorial, supra note 176.
179. T. Harper, "Ottawa blamed for doctor exodus: cutbacks trigger a brain drain, CMA
charges" The Toronto Star (10 June 1998) A3.
180. C. Abraham, supra note 176 at A8.
181. P. Gessell, "Public Service cuts gut federal science programs" The Ottawa Citizen
(8 June 1995) A2 ("The downsizing of the public service has devastated many of the
government's science programs, contribution to a brain drain .... ).
182. D. Francis, "Why a top B.C. researcher joined the brain drain" The Financial Post
(21 July 1998) 11.
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important was a challenging job, followed by exposure to new technol-
ogy, career opportunities, work environment, and training and develop-
ment. Salary was the sixth most important factor.'83
The factors that influence migration decisions has been the subject of
microeconomic modelling and some empirical research as it relates
primarily to inter-provincial or inter-state migration. 184 Since there are no
formal restrictions on the geographical mobility of households between
sub-national government levels, if tax differences were a significant
factor in explaining migration behaviour one might expect it to be evident
in decisions to migrate between provinces, but such appears not to be the
case. For example, in Switzerland, where the main progressive taxes are
state and local taxes, and where owing to the small size of the country
taxpayers can easily move from places with high to places with low taxes,
in a recent empirical study, Gebhard Kirchgassner and Werner
Pommerehne conclude that although taxes play a small but statistically
significant role in explaining where high-income tax payers reside, more
important factors are the strong service orientation in the local economy
(an index of job opportunity for high-income individuals) and large
stocks of infrastructure (an index of the attractiveness of the region).'85
In a thorough review of the empirical studies dealing with inter-
provincial migration induced by changes in Canadian provincial govern-
ment expenditure or tax policies, Kathleen Day and Stanley Winer found
that there is some evidence that such policies as the generosity of the
unemployment insurance system influence interprovincial migration
flows, particularly among lower-income families, but that "[i]n any
given year, most moves appear to be determined by employment and
183. P. Brethour, "Canadian lifestyle not enough to keep tech types" The Globe and Mail
(10 June 1998) B27.
184. The early research is summarized in D.G. Hartle, A Separate Personal Income Tax in
Ontario: An Economic Analysis (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1983) at 302-313, 332
("There is some initial evidence that migration is responsive to taxes. But research on tax-
induced migration is still in the initial stage.").
185. G. Kirchgassner & W.W. Pommerehne, "Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in
the European Union: Lessonsfrom Switzerland" (1996) 60 J. Pub. Econ. 351 at353. (The Swiss
Statistical Office calculates indexes of tax burden on individuals for each canton as a percent
of the national average. In 1990, the index of personal income and property taxes varied from
54.8 in the canton of Zug to 150.5 in the Valais. Thus, "a family with two children earning a
taxable income of SFr200,000 had to pay SFrI 8,223 state and local income taxes in Zug, but
SFr41,944 in Solothurn, two cities within a distance of less than 100 km. Although this is likely
an extreme case, the dispersion of both income and property taxes across the 26 Swiss cantons
has remained relatively stable over time.").
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income considerations, rather than by attempts to profit from fiscal
surpluses." 186
The most comprehensive international study on the effect of taxes on
migration decisions was undertaken by the Institute for Fiscal Studies in
the United Kingdom In the U.K. during the 1970s there was concern that
reduced earnings and increased taxes were adversely affecting British
industry by making it difficult for companies to recruit and retain senior
executives. However, a survey of corporate executives, undertaken at the
Institute for Fiscal Studies, concluded that, "changes in the income and
tax levels of senior staff in the United Kingdom during the 1970s had very
little impact on their ability to retain, recruit, or transfer the managers
required to fill senior positions."'8 s Though during the mid-1970s there
were claims in the popular press that over a quarter of senior mangers
were seriously considering moving abroad, the survey found that only a
few left, and the number that left about equalled the number who returned
to the U.K. during that time. The authors hoped that the results of their
survey would "lay to rest the widespread fears raised in the late 1970s
about the consequences of pay and tax levels of Britain's senior manag-
ers."ss They also noted that their survey provided little evidence showing
that the recently elected Conservative Government's policies lifting
restrictions on pay and lowering tax rates would have any beneficial
effect on British industry.'8 9 A review of the studies in Continental
Europe also concluded that "the mobility of workers between member
countries of the EC is not likely to be very sensitive to differences
between countries in social benefits or after-tax pay."9'
Finally, one has to ask bluntly, even if some high-income individuals
emigrate to the United States in response to higher taxes, is the loss to
Canada so serious that Canadians ought to yield to the pressure their
emigration creates and refashion their public policy to accommodate
them? In considering this question the point that needs reemphasis is that,
in theory, the threat of emigration introduces a constraint not on the
progressivity of the tax system, but on the total degree of redistribution
that a country can hope to achieve by the combined effect of taxation and
186. K.M. Day & S.L. Winer, "Internal Migration and Public Policy: An Introduction to the
Issues and a Review of Empirical Research on Canada" in A.M. Maslove, ed., Issues in the
Taxation of Individuals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 3 at 50.
187. C.G. Fiegehen & W.B. Reddaway, Companies, Incentives and Senior Managers
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) at 92.
188. Ibid. at 101-102.
189. Ibid.
190. J. Ernisch, "European Integration and External Constraints on Social Policy: Is a Social
Charter Necessary?" (May 1991) Nat'l Inst. Econ. Rev. (no. 136) 93 at 104.
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public expenditure. That is to say, the threat of emigration constrains not
just the design of one policy instrument of government but one of the most
fundamental choices to be made by a society-what is the socially
acceptable distribution of income and wealth.
In thinking about how serious the emigration of some talented
individuals is, it is worth noting that even with the increased emigration
to the United States, except for health professionals, Canada remains a net
importer of skilled workers from the rest of the world. Ivan Felligi, the
head of Statistics Canada, has estimated that between 1986 and 1996, the
inflow of knowledge workers into Canada outstripped the outflow by a
ratio of 4 to 1.191 Relying upon Statistics Canada data, Carol Goar of The
Toronto Star concluded that Canada gains nine knowledge-sector work-
ers through immigration, the vast majority from the Pacific rim, for every
one it loses. 92 After an extensive survey of Canadian-based Chief
Executive Officers in 1996, an executive search company concluded that
"companies do not seem to have any significant number of executives
leaving Canada to work for companies in foreign countries."'1 93 It went on
to note that, in any event, "any Canadian 'brain drain' is offset by
Canadian companies recruiting foreign executives to work in Canada." 194
For many of the rich people who leave Canada, there is little evidence
that they make much of a contribution to a country' s well being. Lawyers,
for example, have been accused of being primarily concerned with rent-
seeking rather than wealth creation and, in sufficient numbers, of being
detrimental to a both a country's economic growth and its democratic
institutions. 95 Should the work of Canadian medical professionals,
researchers and scientists residing in the United States prove successful,
its results can be readily imported for the benefit of Canadians. Investors
who leave Canada will presumably continue to invest here if there are
opportunities to make a profit. Rich people who leave Canada and decry
taxes often have an exaggerated sense of their importance to the well-
being of other Canadians.
Some individuals prefer a society in which there is a high degree of
public provision, social cohension, and a large degree of economic
security. Others prefer one in which most goods and services are allocated
on the basis of prices established in markets. One purpose of liberalizing
191. Quoted in E. Greenspon, supra note 173 at A10.
192. C. Goar, supra note 169.
193 Cambridge Management Planning, "'Executive Brain Drain': Foreign Executive Recruit-
ment Survey Results" (Toronto: Cambridge Management Planning, 1996) at 4.
194. Ibid.
195. See L.H. Silberman, "Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism?: A Retrospec-
tive" (1998) 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 607 and the references cited there.
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rules of migration is to allow individuals to seek out those jurisdictions
where taxation and public expenditures, for example, conform to their
preferences. Thus if some individuals move because they are unhappy
with the net benefits they receive from government in Canada, it would
be a terrible mistake to attempt to address that by making Canada more
like the United States. The great majority of Canadians prefer the social
and cultural life of Canada to that of the United States. It would be ironic
if the government were to respond to the emigration of a few by
attempting to make Canada more like the United States. At some point,
the two countries would be so much alike that all mobile Canadians would
move since they would see little reason to put up with the cold weather.
If rich Canadians prefer United States society, and do not wish to remain
and attempt to democratically persuade other Canadians to adopt their
view, then they should leave. It would be odd to allow their departure to
cause Canadians to rethink their collective aspirations when the force of
the emigrants' arguments could not.
Conclusion
The arguments that flattening the tax rate will simplify the tax system,
lead to less tax evasion, and generate new found economic prosperity, are
without support. They are so obviously without merit, that I rather suspect
that even those who propound them do not take them seriously. Instead,
they likely support flat taxes largely because they feel that progressive
taxes are the moral equivalent of stealing from the rich and that the type
of society implied by large inequalities in the distribution of economic
resources is to be preferred to one in which resources are distributed more
equally. Flat taxers are even more plainly wrong about these normative
issues than they are about the conceptual and empirical grounds that
ostensibly underlie their support for flat taxes. This essay is already too
long. However, in conclusion, since at the end of the day they are so
central to tax issues such as the rate structure, and to provide some context
for the conceptual and empirical questions, these normative issues should
be clarified.
One of the fundamental differences between those who support flat
taxes and those who support progressive tax rates comes down to their
respective views on the ethical justification for the market distribution of
income. On the one hand, those who support flat taxes presumably feel
that the market distribution of income is just: people deserve their good
fortune in our society. Hence, there is no ethicaljustification for collective
action that reduces the amount that people earn in the market place, but
if it must be reduced to provide for public goods then it should be reduced
Flattening the Claims of the Flat Taxers
in proportion to their income. On the other hand, those who support
progressive rates are likely to feel that the market distribution has no
ethical justification and that the state should use the tax system to achieve
a more socially acceptable distribution of income. The only income that
individuals have any kind of moral claim to is their post-tax income.
Those who support progressive taxation as an instrument for redistrib-
uting income on these grounds do not necessarily deny the utility of
markets or the institution of private property. It is surely possible to argue
that the free market's distribution of income is not just, but at the same
time concede that markets are the best way to coordinate the exchange of
goods and services in order to maximize their production and perhaps
even individual freedom. It is surely not inconsistent to argue that to the
extent that the rich can engage in a form of extortion, by withholding
services or capital, payments to them might be necessary, but that does
not make them just.
This article has no pretensions. Thus, it is not my intention to critically
review or even summarize, let alone purport to resolve, the many
hundreds of years of debate over whether or not there is any ethical
principle that would support the market distribution of income; however,
since my support for progressive taxation, and my opposition to flat taxes,
rests largely on the grounds that there is not, I will briefly summarize my
position. Many theories of distributive justice challenge the justness of
the market distribution of income; however, the simplest way of briefly
showing that the market distribution of income is unjust is to deal directly
with the intuitions that are commonly relied upon in defending the market
distribution of income. There would appear to be two such intuitions.
First, one intuition that suggests the market distribution of income is
just rests upon the assumption that people's earnings are a measure of the
value of their contribution to the social welfare and therefore their
personal desert. However, to be at all persuasive there are a number of
obvious problems such a theory would have to overcome, to list just a
few: the value of individual contributions to social welfare are impossible
to determine since all contributions are of an intrinsically social nature
and all income is cooperatively generated, therefore, the rules of property
and contract cannot sensibly distinguish between individual contribu-
tions in the production of goods and services; the demand side of the
labour market does not reward skills that are socially valuable but skills
that individuals with money demand; in the same way, the supply side of
the market does not reward skills that are valuable or admirable but skills
that are scarce; large earnings are often the result of morally irrelevant
factors because the contributor has no control over them, such as the
accident of being born into a family of wealth, the chance event of being
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raised in a wealthy country, the good fortune of remaining able-bodied
and working for a firm that remains profitable and in Canada, the good
luck of investing in the right stock, or the fortuity of being born with an
inherited talent that is in scarce supply; and finally, even if an individual's
contributions were morally relevant in determining the amount to which
they should have a moral claim, in real markets, factors such as social
conventions, discrimination, monopoly power, and government regula-
tion are much more likely than productivity to determine the size
distribution of income.
A second intuition underlying the notion that the market distribution
of earnings is presumptively just rests upon the judgement that the
process by which earnings are distributed appears to be fair. However,
this process-claim arbitrarily assumes that the initial distribution of
income and wealth isjust; that people only have property and not broader
social rights; that the marketplace in which people trade is free (that is,
that people's choices are always fully informed and non-coerced) and
neutral (that is, that the rules that define the marketplace do not favour
some over others); and, that individuals only have entitlements to goods
and services allocated through markets but not to those allocated by other
social forms of organization. None of these assumptions is easy to
support.
The other fundamental difference that likely separates flat taxers and
those who favour progressive taxes is a view about what constitutes the
good society. Flat taxers are likely to feel that the individual is the basic
unit of society, that individuals differ significantly from one another, that
some are inherently more motivated, competent, and self-reliant than
others and that the good society allows for, encourages and rewards these
differences. Those who support progressive taxes are more likely to
emphasize that a good society is one in which everyone is entitled to equal
respect, that there should be some measure of solidarity among citizens,
that equal membership in society is required to sustain a democracy, and
that these values can only be achieved if economic resources are rela-
tively equally distributed.
A progressive tax system itself cannot turn back the rising tide of
inequality. It will take concerted action on every front, including enrich-
ing earlier childhood education, providing increased economic security
and bargaining power for workers, glutting high-skilled labour markets
with university graduates and so on. But a progressive tax system is an
important instrument for reducing inequality. Moreover, it serves the
important symbolic function of reminding people that in our society we
do not necessarily think that, for example, the head of a beer company is
worth more than over 100 nurses, or that the head of an auto parts
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company is worth over 300 kindergarten teachers, in spite of the judge-
ment of the so-called free market. At a time when over 20 percent of the
children in this country and almost 60 percent of single mothers live in
poverty, to give relatively well off Canadians, including tenured univer-
sity professors like myself, a tax break, through the adoption of flat taxes,
would not only be bad economic policy and perverse social policy, it
would be immoral.
